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INTRODUCTION
Predictions that demands on the world oil supply will soon peak,
1
with dire consequences for the United States and world economies,
are prompting government agencies, industry experts, and legal
scholars to consider a wide range of solutions to satisfy future energy
2
needs.
Among the proposed solutions is a renewed focus on
enhanced oil recovery (“EOR”) as a major contributor to future

1. See Peter Maass, The Breaking Point, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 6 (Magazine),
at 30 (noting that unlike the 1973 oil crisis, today there is a narrow gap between
supply and demand, increasing the risk of an oil shortfall); Avrel Seale, How Long Do
We Have?, ALCALDE, July-Aug. 2005, at 40 (highlighting speculation that the gap
between supply and demand could widen “exponentially” and result in “runaway
inflation, depression, and eventual economic collapse”). But see Doris Leblond, IEA
Underscores Technology’s Contribution to Future Oil Supply, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 17, 2005, at
18 (stating that the International Energy Agency Executive Director dismissed “the
‘peak oil’ notion that conventional oil is entering a period of inevitable decline”).
2. See Ron Gold, John Lichtblau, & Larry Goldstein, Energy Policy Act of 2005
Leaves U.S. with Open Issues, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 22, 2005, at 20, 21 (noting the
importance of “supply-oriented policy”); see also Leblond, supra note 1, at 20
(discussing various technological solutions to meeting increased demands on the
world’s oil supply, including steam-assisted gravity drainage and cold heavy oil
production with sand); Seale, supra note 1, at 41-45 (highlighting assessments of
current world oil production by three University of Texas faculty members).
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3

domestic and world oil supplies. EOR is the use of a variety of
4
techniques to increase the total amount of oil a field can produce.
EOR is a form of conservation because it produces oil that would
5
otherwise remain trapped or “wasted” in the ground. Enhanced
recovery operations require that all tracts overlying an oil field merge
6
into one production unit controlled by a single operator, through a
7
legal process called unitization. The first unitization laws were
voluntary, and their failure to substantially increase the number of
unit operations led most states to enact compulsory unitization
statutes. Compulsory unitization laws allow State conservation
3. See Leblond, supra note 1, at 19 fig.3 (indicating that additional EOR
potential may provide nearly ten percent (300 billion barrels) of the ultimately
recoverable conventional oil worldwide); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE Selects New
Projects to Enhance Oil and Gas Production (Dec. 8, 2004), http://
www.fossil.energy.gov/news/techlines/2004 (follow “DOE Selects New Projects to
Enhance Oil and Gas” hyperlink) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Energy, DOE Selects
New Projects] (stating that projects that implement EOR techniques could reach
“billions of barrels of oil that today are left behind in the nation’s oil fields”); see also
Ernest E. Smith, Legal Issues Involved in Expanding the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Base, 52
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 4-1, 4-2 (2001) (prefacing his proposals for changing
current oil and gas laws with the idea that expanding U.S. oil and gas reserves
depends on implementing existing technology that is “commercially feasible and
legally practicable”).
4. See Owen L. Anderson, Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful Unit
Operations, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-5 n.6 (1984) (“Methods of enhanced
recovery are divided into two broad categories: Secondary recovery which refers to
the more conventional methods of waterflooding and gas injection, and tertiary
recovery which refers to the more complex and relatively new techniques, such as
surfactant flooding, carbon dioxide flooding, steam injection, and fire flooding.”).
5. See Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the
2004 Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 277, 278 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson & Smith, Playing Field]
(describing how early oil regulation allowed operators to drill too many wells, which
“dissipated the natural reservoir energy that pushed the oil and gas through the
reservoir” and resulted in underground waste as oil and gas “became
unrecoverable”).
6. INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N MODEL STATUTE AND FIELDWIDE
UNITIZATION REFERENCES § III (1999) [hereinafter IOGCC REFERENCES] (describing
the prerequisites and purposes of EOR processes, namely to operate as one unit and
to substantially increase primary recovery production rates) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
7. Unitization, also called unit operation, is “the operation of separately owned
tracts of land for oil and gas as if they are one tract under one ownership and with
disregard to property lines or interests, except for the apportionment of the costs
and proceeds . . . whether the aggregate of the area developed is large or small.” 1
W. L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.49 (3d ed. 2004). Unitization is
intended to regulate oil production involving an entire field or a large part of a field
and requires the cooperation of various mineral interest owners and operators in the
field. 5 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 78.1 (1987).
Unitization “addresses fractionalization and subdivision by consolidating multiple
tracts and interests into a single unified block to allow for orderly development and
efficient operations to prevent surface, underground, and economic waste.” Owen
L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith III, The Use of Law to Promote Domestic Exploration and
Production, PETROLEUM ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. J. 67, 68 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson &
Smith, Use of Law].
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commissions to force reluctant owners to join unit operations.
However, most compulsory unitization laws include provisions
requiring approval of the unitization plan by a substantial majority of
owners before the commission can order unitization.
These
provisions hamper the effectiveness of compulsory unitization laws by
8
allowing small interest owners to prevent unitization. Small interest
owners may oppose unitization despite the unitization’s long term
benefits, including increased total recovery, because they believe the
9
unitization process is inherently unfair.
The opposition to
unitization that results from the perception of unfairness poses a
major challenge to wider implementation of unit operations and
increased use of enhance recovery techniques.
This Comment posits that mandatory appointment of neutral
experts in compulsory unitization proceedings may decrease
opposition to unitization by providing greater assurance that every
interest owner will receive a fair share of oil production. At the heart
of many of these disputes is the “allocation formula,” which should
apportion a fair and equitable share of production to each interest
10
owner. While the allocation formula should be based on “pertinent
11
engineering, geological and operating factors,” it is often more
12
influenced by the interests and bargaining power of the parties.
8. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 88-89 (comparing the
percentages required in compulsory pooling to those for unitization); Paula C.
Murray & Frank B. Cross, The Case for a Texas Compulsory Unitization Statute, 23 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1099, 1148-49 (1992) (arguing that the best compulsory unitization law
has no ratification requirement).
9. For the purposes of this Comment, “small interest owners” includes working
interest owners and mineral interest owners whose proportional interest in a given
unit is insufficient to allow them to prevent creation of the unit. “Small interest”
refers to the relative size of an interest owner’s share in the overall unit as compared
with the ratification requirement in the state statute. For example, the Oklahoma
statute requires that not less than sixty-three percent of the working interest and
royalty owners approve the unitization plan. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.5 (West
2000). See Raymond M. Myers, Agreements Relative to Secondary Recovery Operations,
Their Negotiation and Execution, and the Role of the Landman, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
245, 267-68 (1961) (detailing various state ratification requirements). Thus, a
hypothetical working interest owner with thirty-seven percent of the vote in a
proposed unit in Oklahoma could be a small interest owner because his vote alone
would not block the Corporation Commission from ordering creation of the unit.
10. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:18A (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52,
§ 287.4(b) (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-110(e) (2005); see also William F.
Carr, Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-1, 21-11 (2003)
(noting that with all compulsory unitization acts the state regulatory authority must
determine whether the proposed unit participation formula is “fair and equitable”).
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (West 2000).
12. See Owen L. Anderson & Dr. John D. Pigott, 3D Seismic Technology: Its Uses,
Limits, & Legal Ramifications, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1, 16-64 (1996)
(suggesting that commission-approved allocation formulas are “more likely to
represent the biased interests of those who voted to approve the formula at the
expense of those who opposed it”); Myers, supra note 9, at 261 (suggesting that while
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When disputes over allocation arise, the adversarial nature of
compulsory unitization proceedings often results in major operators
advocating their unitization plan and allocation formula against
opposition from wary small interest owners in a battle of experts
before the state conservation commission.
Small interest owners enter the unitization process wary of major
operators proposing unitization for a variety of reasons, including an
awareness that major operators’ considerable financial and
13
technological resources give them superior bargaining power. State
commissions, whose conservation duty to prevent wasteful production
of oil precedes the duty of ensuring fair production allocation, often
order unitization based on the major operator’s plan, despite
14
conflicting evidence that the proposal might be unfair.
These
aspects of the compulsory unitization process have resulted in the
perception that it inherently results in an unfair allocation of
production to small interest owners.
For years courts and regulatory agencies have appointed neutral
experts to obtain unbiased assessments of scientific evidence. In the
case of oil and gas regulation, several states have provisions that allow
their conservation commissions to appoint independent examiners
and consultants to advise the commission. In the compulsory
unitization context, Professor Owen L. Anderson has proposed the
appointment of independent consultants to review unitization plans
to reduce skepticism about the fairness of compulsory unitization
proceedings. As in other settings, neutral experts may benefit from
compulsory unitization proceedings in a number of ways, including
encouraging the parties to settle their disputes outside the
commission and the courts.
Part I of this Comment traces the development of compulsory
unitization through the context of oil reservoir geology, the history of
oil and gas regulation, and the importance of enhanced oil recovery
to conservation. Part II examines the basis for small interest owners’
objections to unitization and highlights the importance of the
allocation formula in securing agreement and fairness. Part II then
argues that the failure of the compulsory unitization process to deal
the ideal formula should be proportioned to each tract’s exact contribution to the
unit, “too often it is a question of give and take”).
13. See infra Part II.C.1 (highlighting the sources of small interest owners’
skepticism of major operators and the inherent disadvantages small interest owners
face in negotiating allocation formulas).
14. See infra Part II.C.2 (explicating how the commission’s preeminent duty to
prevent waste and tendency to approve unitization agreements in the face of
conflicting evidence, adds to the perception that unitization is inherently unfair).
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effectively with small interest owners’ concerns has resulted in the
perception that unitization is inherently unfair to small interest
owners. Part III analyzes the authority and context for appointing
neutral experts in the courts, federal agencies, and state conservation
agencies, demonstrates how neutral experts may help assure small
interest owners of the fairness of compulsory unitization, and
addresses traditional criticism of neutral experts as applied to the
unitization process. Part IV suggests that compulsory unitization
statutes should allow interest owners to demand that the conservation
commission appoint a neutral expert to review disputed allocation
formulas before issuing an order for unitization. This proposal aims
to reassure small interest owners that they can receive a fair share of
production, thereby helping to eliminate the perception that the
compulsory unitization process is inherently unfair and reducing
opposition to unitization.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPULSORY UNITIZATION
A. The Geology of Oil and the Rule of Capture
Classical property law fails to adequately address the physical
15
properties of oil and gas.
Oil and gas reservoirs are found in
geologic formations where impermeable rock layers surround and
16
trap oil and gas in porous rock layers below. The size and shape of
reservoirs vary and they often extend for miles below the surface and
17
underlie multiple surface property lines. The geological features of
a reservoir, such as porosity, permeability, thickness, and quantity of
18
oil or gas, generally vary across the reservoir. Gas and water, also
found in the reservoir, create the natural pressure that drives oil out

15. See Murray & Cross, supra note 8, at 1102 (noting that the physical
characteristics of oil and gas conflict with traditional property law “because geology
does not follow Blackstone”).
16. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of
Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 305 (1973-74); see also H. H. Kaveler, The
Engineering Basis for and the Results from the Unit Operation of Oil Pools, 23 TUL. L. REV.
331, 338 (1948-49) (positing that these two qualities are “fundamental principles that
apply to . . . oil production” which permit a “more intelligent approach to the
problem of oil recovery and conservation”).
17. Murray & Cross, supra note 8, at 1103 (noting that classical property law and
the rule of capture work reasonably well for solid minerals but create problems for
gas and liquids).
18. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that
conservation commissions typically treat all the tracts the same, despite varying
geological factors, because they assume that reservoirs are heterogeneous, that wells
drain evenly and in a predictable pattern, and that neighboring wells will not make
their operation problematic).
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19

of the ground during production. During production, oil migrates
through the reservoir without regard for the surface property lines
20
above. This fugacious characteristic of oil is the cause of problems
associated with the regulation of oil production.
The initial legal response to disputes over oil production was the
21
rule of capture.
Applied to the context of oil drilling and
production, the rule of capture entitles a landowner to produce as
much oil as possible without incurring liability to neighboring
22
landowners for oil drained from beneath their property. Lacking a
legal remedy when one landowner drills a well, the only option for
23
neighboring landowners was to drill offset wells to prevent drainage.
Thus, neighboring landowners and producers had to compete in
drilling and production to maintain an interest in the oil beneath
24
their property.
This type of production resulted in economic,
25
surface, and underground waste. In spite of this fact, the rule of
19. L. Proctor Thomas, Comment, Prospects for Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization in
Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 510, 512 (1966) (describing the “mechanics” of three types of
natural driving forces, solution-gas, gas-cap and water drives, and concluding that
fieldwide recovery is the most effective use of natural pressure); see also David W.
Eckman, Statutory Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units: A Review for Future Agreements, 6 NAT.
RESOURCES LAW. 339, 342 (1973) (stating that displacement, the process in which gas
and water take the place of oil as it is produced, is one of “three important principles
that make unitization valuable”).
20. See McDonald, supra note 16, at 306 (noting that “the capacity of oil to flow
freely in the reservoir to points of relatively low pressure creates the possibility
of [competing producers in a common reservoir] inducing a flow across property
lines”); Ernest E. Smith, The Kansas Unitization Statute: Part I, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 567,
567 (1967-68) [hereinafter Smith, Kansas I] (“The reservoir is a geologic unit which
rarely, if ever, corresponds with the boundaries of surface ownership.”).
21. See Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa.
1889) (adopting the rule of capture for oil by analogizing the fugitive nature of oil
and gas to that of wild animals); see also Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The
Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 906-07 (2005)
(discussing the importance of De Witt in establishing a line of cases that resulted in
“the ‘pure’ form of the rule of capture” as the predominant rule for oil and gas
ownership); Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era
of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 19-20 (1996)
(discussing the search by judges in early oil and gas cases for analogous areas of law
on which to base their legal reasoning).
22. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, at 56 (Patrick
H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., Matthew Bender 1996) [hereinafter WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, LAW]; see also Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 391 (1935) (highlighting the
characterization and criticisms of the rule of capture).
23. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 68-69; see also WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, LAW, supra note 22, at 57 (characterizing the traditional remedy available to
the injured party as “self-help”); see also Kaveler, supra note 16, at 334-35 (applying
the rule of capture to a hypothetical situation where neighboring landowners
attempt to maintain well parity).
24. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 69 (listing the standard
legislative response to wasteful production associated with the rule of capture).
25. Id. (stating that the proliferation of oil well-related surface apparatuses
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capture was the standard governing oil and gas production before
26
state regulation.
B. Regulatory Response: Conservation and Protection of Correlative Rights
States legislatures responded to wasteful oil production under the
27
rule of capture by enacting regulations on production In 1900, the
Supreme Court upheld a law that restricted the rights operators to
flare natural gas during production as a valid use of state police
28
power to prevent waste and protect correlative rights. Correlative
rights are the rights of owners to the opportunity to produce the oil
29
and gas beneath their property. The two constitutionally accepted
bases for regulation remain the conservation of oil and gas through
30
preventing waste and the protection of correlative rights.
In the early twentieth century, states also began delegating the
authority to regulate production of oil and gas to newly formed or
31
existing commissions.
The two purposes of state regulations on
caused surface waste, the dissipation of natural energy resulted in underground
waste, and the reduction in oil prices from increased production made drilling and
production unprofitable).
26. See KUNTZ, supra note 7, at § 4.1 (arguing that the rule of capture requires
“no apologies” since there is a void of conservation regulation that would otherwise
govern decisions in this area). See generally Kramer & Anderson, supra note 21
(chronicling the late 19th and early 20th century history of the common law
development of the rule of capture); Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic
Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S591
(2002) (characterizing this period in the development of oil and gas regulation as
“extractive anarchy,” when “actions by individual producers intending to exploit the
rule of capture . . . [went] unrestrained”).
27. See Eckman, supra note 19, at 345 (summarizing early conservation efforts in
response to wasteful production under the rule of capture).
28. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); see BRUCE KRAMER & PAT
MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 2-10 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter
KRAMER & MARTIN, UNITIZATION] (characterizing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana as “[a]
landmark case that could have served as the basis for broadening the theory of
common-law rule of capture”); Eckman, supra note 19, at 345 (stating that Ohio Oil
Company v. Indiana “firmly established” conservation and protection of correlative
rights as valid use of the state’s police power).
29. “‘Protection of correlative rights’ . . . means to afford a reasonable
opportunity to each owner to recover, or to receive without causing waste, a just and
equitable share of the production.” INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N 2004
MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT § 1(16) (2004) [hereinafter IOGCC MODEL
ACT] (on file with the American University Law Review).
30. See Gary L. Leary, Compulsory Unitization—The Answer to Oil and Gas
Conservation?, 7 UCLA L. REV. 312, 314 (1960) (“If a statute bears a reasonable
relationship either to conservation of resources or adjustment of correlative rights of
owners, it is valid.”).
31. See JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 3840 (Jo Hinkel ed., 1986) [hereinafter WEAVER, UNITIZATION] (describing delegation
of authority to the Texas Railroad Commission); Maurice H. Merrill, Stabilization of
the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 396, 399 (1930) (tracing the
development of oil regulation in Oklahoma).
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production are the prevention of waste and protection of correlative
32
rights. Over the years, states have used a variety of regulations to
prevent waste and protect correlative rights, including well-spacing
33
34
and density regulations, prorationing, maximum efficient rate
35
36
(“MER”) production limits, and pooling. However, this “well-by37
well regulatory approach” has been criticized for failing to
38
adequately protect correlative rights and prevent waste.
C. Unitization: “The Ultimate Conservation Tool”

39

Enhanced recovery is the most efficient method of producing oil
and results in reduced costs and longer field life. Because successful
enhanced recovery often depends on unitization prior to production
operations, the growing importance of enhanced recovery led to calls
for more unitization. The inability of owners to unitize voluntarily
led states to enact compulsory unitization laws intended to overcome
small interest owners who held out for greater concessions. While
32.
KRAMER & MARTIN, UNITIZATION, supra note 28, at § 5.01.
33. Spacing and density rules limit the number of and minimum distance
between wells that can be drilled in a given area. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law,
supra note 7, at 70 (explaining that such rules intend but often fail to result in a
“uniform pattern of wells . . . based upon a pattern of drilling units of uniform size
and shape”); Leary, supra note 30, at 316 (concluding that well spacing rules
ultimately and unfortunately result in a proliferation of exceptions to those rules).
34. Under prorationing, states set production limits on wells based on predicted
market demand. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 71 (defining that
demand as “reasonable”); Leary, supra note 30, at 315 (asserting that production
above reasonable demand results in waste by requiring greater above-ground
storage).
35. MER places limits on production, which have been calculated to maximize
recovery from a reservoir. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 70
(defining MER as the point at which an increase in production will reduce recovery).
36. See Anderson & Smith, Playing Field, supra note 5, at 281 (discussing how
pooling fails adequately to address both conservation agency objectives and the
potential for working interest owner free-riding).
37. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 68, 69-73 (characterizing all oil
and gas regulations except for unitization).
38. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 68-81 (arguing that the
traditional well-by-well regulatory approach is plagued by problems that make it
inefficient); James L. Smith, Problematic Economic Aspects of Oil Field Unitization, 53
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 9-1, 9-2 (2002) (stating that traditional regulations provide
“[e]ach . . . producing firm . . . an incentive to maximize the economic value of its
leases, rather than that of the hydrocarbon reservoir as a whole,” which results in
“dissipat[ion of] reservoir rents with excessive capital, too rapid production, and lost
total recovery”); McDonald, supra note 16, at 307-08 (arguing that state attempts to
address the problems created by the competition for oil and gas, such as density
regulations, flaring prohibitions, production controls, and voluntary unitization,
have failed to protect both correlative rights and to provide the maximum benefit to
society through conservation); Murray & Cross, supra note 8, at 1118-19 (discussing
the problems created by mandatory spacing rules and characterizing them as having
limited effectiveness and leading to potential inequality between interest owners).
39. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 67.
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compulsory unitization procedures differ from state to state, virtually
all contain certain procedural safeguards to protect owners’
correlative rights.
1. The importance of enhanced recovery and reliance on unitization
The petroleum industry has long recognized the benefits of
40
Production of oil takes place in two stages,
enhanced recovery.
primary and enhanced recovery, although primary recovery does not
have to be complete for enhanced recovery to begin. Primary
41
production relies entirely on the natural pressure in the well and
42
recovers only ten to thirty percent of the oil in a reservoir. On the
other hand, enhanced recovery generally increases primary recovery
43
by thirty to sixty percent and in some cases over 100%. Enhanced
recovery is a conservation measure because it allows for the
production of oil that would otherwise remain trapped in the ground
after primary production has exhausted the well’s natural pressure.
As enhanced recovery technology developed and became more
important to the nation’s oil supply it generated greater calls for
44
unitization.
Unitization is necessary to spread the high costs of
40. See Winfield S. Payne, Jr., The Engineering Phases Applicable to Unit Plans, 5
UCLA L. REV. 401, 401 (1958) (noting that by 1958, oil produced through secondary
recovery had greatly increased total recovery and become a valuable source of daily
oil supply).
41. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 746
(7th ed. 1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS].
42. IOGCC REFERENCES, supra note 6, app. A; see also Eckman, supra note 19, at
342 (discussing the geologic fundamentals needed to understand the purpose and
value of unitization, including the necessity and ability to develop the reservoir as a
whole, the effects of the process of displacement, and the required control of
production rates to manage the reservoir); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Federal
Government as a Useful Enemy: Perspectives on the Bush Energy/Environmental Agenda From
the Texas Oilfields, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (noting that under unrestrained
conditions, recovery can be as little as five percent).
43. IOGCC REFERENCES, supra note 6, § III; see also Myers, supra note 9, at 246
(suggesting that enhanced recovery operations increase ultimate recovery to as much
as eighty percent). There are two main types of enhanced recovery: basic secondary
recovery and more technologically advanced tertiary recovery. See supra note 4.
Secondary recovery is “the deliberate, controlled injection of water into an oilproducing stratum for the purpose of increasing the percentage and rate of recovery
of oil from the stratum.” Thomas M. Golden, Comment, Secondary Recovery
Operations—Protection of Correlative Rights, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 129, 130 (1967)
(citations omitted); see also Myers, supra note 9, at 247 (describing the four
recognized methods of secondary recovery). Tertiary recovery involves the injection
of chemicals or energy to displace oil. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 41, at
997.
44. See William L. Horner, Calculation of Just and Equitable Shares, 2 INST. ON MIN.
LAW 69, 69 (1954) (citations omitted) (“In 1952 approximately 400 million barrels of
oil, or one-fifth of the nation’s production, came from fields with pressure regulation
by fluid injection, mostly under some form of unit operation.”); see also Kaveler, supra
note 16, at 332 (noting that by 1949, “Committees of Government, the American Bar
Association, the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, a large majority of the
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45

enhanced recovery and because successful repressurization requires
46
other wells to stop production.
2. Development of compulsory unitization and compulsory unitization
proceedings
Compulsory unitization is universally recognized as the best way to
conserve oil and gas while simultaneously protecting correlative
47
rights. States enacted compulsory unitization statutes because of
48
Compulsory
interest owners’ failure to unitize voluntarily.
unitization statutes allow state conservation commissions to force
non-consenting interest owners into a unitization agreement if the
49
commission finds that the plan will prevent waste.
Oklahoma created the first compulsory unitization act for oil in
1945, which required the consent of eighty-five percent of the interest
oil producing industry, and a predominant majority of the engineering and
geological professions all advocate[d] unit operation of oil and gas pools”).
45. See Leary, supra note 30, at 319 (listing the reasons unit operations are
necessary to use secondary recovery methods); see also Anderson & Smith, Use of Law,
supra note 7, at 89 (arguing that the ratification requirement in compulsory
unitization statutes exists because operators have to pay high costs for enhanced
recovery).
46. See Leary, supra note 30, at 319 (reviewing the reasons interest owners refuse
to unitize, including where unitization would require a production break); see also
Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, The Effect of Pooling and Unitization Upon Oil
& Gas Leases, 45 CAL. L. REV. 411, 435 (1957) (listing pressure maintenance,
recycling, and secondary recovery as “sound conservation practices” that require
large amounts of acreage without respect to property lines).
47. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron,
24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 187 (2004) [hereinafter Weaver, Spindletop to
Enron] (noting that Texas is the only state without a compulsory unitization statute),
see also McDonald, supra note 16, at 312 (arguing that compulsory unitization of all
oil reservoirs would result in “conservation in a meaningful sense” and “true
protection of correlative rights”).
48. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 84 (discussing the reasons
that voluntary unitization failed, the problem of “holdout” parties, and the
government response); Richard A. Forster, Oil and Gas: The Corporation Commission’s
Role in Evaluating the Prudence of Operations in Statutory Unitization, 24 WASHBURN L.J.
191, 195 (1985) (summarizing development of compulsory unitization statutes).
Voluntary unitization failed for many of the same reasons that continue to make
compulsory unitization difficult. See Anderson & Smith, Playing Field, supra note 5, at
278 (reasoning that voluntary unitization fails because high transaction costs and
strategic behaviors prevent parties from successfully negotiating an agreement);
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Armtwisting Operators and Owners to Unitize: The Role of State
Conservation Commissions in Preventing Waste, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 4-1, 4-5
to 4-7 (1987) [hereinafter Weaver, Armtwisting] (discussing the obstacles to voluntary
unitization); Smith, Kansas I, supra note 20, at 567-68 (indicating that mineral
interest owners who benefit the most from unrestricted drilling also demand major
concessions that effectively end voluntary unitization negotiations).
49. WEAVER, UNITIZATION, supra note 31, at 2; see also Carr, supra note 10, at 21-3
(summarizing the goal, effect and purpose of compulsory unitization); James M.
Whittier, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: Die-Hard Kansas, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 307,
311 (1967) (“It is widely recognized that the value of unitization as a conservation
measure justifies the compulsion of the dissenting minority.”).
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owners before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission could order
50
unit operations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the Act as a
51
valid exercise of state police power. Following failed challenges to
the Act in the courts and the legislature, the legislature lowered the
52
consent requirement to sixty-three percent in 1951.
Since then,
53
every major oil producing state, with the exception of Texas, has
54
adopted a compulsory unitization statute.
55
While compulsory unitization process varies between states, nearly
all proceedings start with an application and a plan for unitization,
require the commission to provide notice and a hearing to all interest
owners, and result in a finding by the commission and an order to
proceed once the requisite number of owners has ratified the
56
ordered plan. The compulsory unitization process usually begins
when an operator submits a unitization plan to the conservation
57
commission for approval. These plans are often the result of years
58
of research and analysis. In many cases, extensive negotiations over
50. See Libecap & Smith, supra note 26, at 596 (tracing the development of
compulsory unitization laws). See generally Barth P. Walker, Recent Developments in
Pooling and Unitization, 6 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 47, 118-37 (1955) (discussing
the history of the Oklahoma Unitization Act).
51. Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1005 (Okla. 1951)
(holding that Oklahoma’s Unitization Act was not an unconstitutional legislative
delegation of power); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada, 343 U.S. 390, 391 (1952)
(dismissing the appeal for failure to raise a substantial federal question).
52. See Libecap & Smith, supra note 26, at 596 (noting that by 1951, little
opposition remained to unitization in Oklahoma). The Oklahoma Unitization Act
of 1951 was also challenged in the courts and survived on the same police power
rationale as the 1945 Act. See Carr, supra note 10, at 21-4 (summarizing the history of
compulsory unitization).
53. IOGCC REFERENCES, supra note 6, § I; Weaver, Spindletop to Enron, supra note
47, at 187.
54. See Carr, supra note 10, app. A (listing every state compulsory unitization
statute).
55. Id. at 21-4 to -5. See generally Morris G. Gray & Oscar E. Swan, Fieldwide
Unitization in Wyoming, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1972) (discussing the
history and procedures of the Wyoming unitization statute); Ernest E. Smith, The
Kansas Unitization Statute: Part II, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 133 (1968) [hereinafter Smith,
Kansas II] (discussing compulsory unitization procedures under the Kansas
unitization statute).
56. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-5 to -8 (describing the typical compulsory
unitization process from development of the unitization plan and allocation formula
to ratification); see also Carr, supra note 10, at 21-4 to -6 (discussing the common
provisions and safeguards shared by all compulsory unitization procedures).
57. See Trees Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Kan. 2005) (noting
that several operators submitted an application for unitization); Eason Oil Co. v.
Corp. Comm’n, 535 P.2d 283, 285 (Okla. 1975) (stating that one operator, Sun Oil
Company, had applied for unitization).
58. See Eason Oil, 535 P.2d at 285 (indicating that two years passed between
initiation of the study in August 1971 and filing the application for unitization in
1973); Jones v. Continental Oil Co., 420 P.2d 905, 907 (Okla. 1966) (noting that the
unitization plan proposed resulted from a three-year study by the majority
operators); Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-5 (describing the steps proponents of a
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59

the formula may precede the application. After notice has been
given to all interested parties, the commission holds a hearing in
which parties present evidence on the fairness of the unitization plan
60
and allocation formula. In most cases the commission will approve
61
The final requirement of almost every
the plan as submitted.
compulsory unitization statute is the ratification of the plan by a
super majority of interest owners, between sixty-three percent and
62
eighty percent in the major oil producing states. The ratification
requirement necessary to order unitization is the primary procedural
safeguard for owners and one of the major obstacles to more
63
widespread unitization.

plan follow, including feasibility investigation and development of the allocation
formula).
59. See Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo.
1982) (noting that the operators held meetings in which they voted on nearly sixty
different formulas before becoming “frustrated in their attempt” to meet the
ratification requirement); see also Carr, supra note 10, at 21-5 (noting some states
have a safeguard provision requiring interest owners to attempt to negotiate a
voluntary agreement before applying to the commission to force unitization).
60. Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-7 n.11; see, e.g., Trees Oil Co., 105 P.3d at 1272
(noting that at the hearing five “technical witnesses” testified and presented
exhibits); Bishop v. Corp. Comm’n, 394 P.2d 235, 237 (Okla. 1975) (recounting the
testimony at the hearing by expert witnesses for the proponent and opponent of the
plan).
61. Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-7.
62. Texas, Alaska, California, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and
Kansas were the top eight oil producing states in 2004. Energy Information
Administration, Crude Oil Production, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_
crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm (last visited May 27, 2006).
Because Texas has no
compulsory unitization law it is one of the more difficult places to implement unit
operations. See Weaver, Spindletop to Enron, supra note 47, at 189 (characterizing the
Texas Railroad Commission’s method of encouraging unitization as the “second-best
solution” using “sticks and carrots to alternatively bludgeon and encourage Texas
operators into unitizing voluntarily”). California, Louisiana, and New Mexico
require seventy-five percent of owners to ratify the unitization plan. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 3642 (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-8
(West 1978). Wyoming requires eighty percent ratification of a unitization plan,
which the commission may lower to seventy-five percent if certain criteria are met.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-110 (2005); see also Gilmore, 642 P.2d at 775 (stating that the
proponents of the plans met the criteria for lowering the ratification requirement).
Alaska, the second largest producer of oil, has no ratification requirement; however,
it is less comparable to other states because most of its oil is under federal land, thus
subject to federal law. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 84 n.50. In
2000, the Kansas legislature lowered the Kansas ratification requirement from
seventy-five percent to sixty-three percent. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1305 (Supp. 2003);
see also Trees Oil Co., 105 P.3d at 1276 (stating that the legislature intended to foster
and enhance unitization by lowering the ratification requirement).
63. See Carr, supra note 10, at 21-5 to -6 (listing the “safeguards” in the
compulsory unitization procedure that protect the interest owners, including the
ratification formula); Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 84-86
(describing the two limits on the commission’s authority in compulsory unitization—
the requirement of a significant percentage of voluntary agreement and a showing
that unitization is necessary—and their effect on the process).
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II. OBJECTIONS TO UNITIZATION AND THE PERCEPTION OF UNFAIRNESS
64

Despite the benefits of compulsory unitization, obtaining greater
65
unitization has been problematic.
Mineral interest owners—
generally landowners who lease the right to produce the oil under
66
their property to an operator in exchange for a royalty —and
working interest owners—the operators who explore, drill, and
67
produce the oil and gas —may oppose a particular unitization plan
or the concept of unitization in general for a myriad of reasons.
While some of these reasons are theoretical or personal in nature, the
most common reason owners reject unitization agreements is the
68
perception that the formula allocating production is unfair.
A. Theoretical and Individualized Objections to Unitization
Some objections to the concept of unitization are based on the
notion that unitization is an invasion of personal property rights.
One common criticism of compulsory unitization is that it disregards
69
individual interests in favor of a “societal policy.” Another popular
argument is that compulsory unitization violates private property
70
rights. Similarly, some small operators oppose unitization because
64. See Weaver, Spindletop to Enron, supra note 47, at 187 (discussing the need for
compulsory unitization statutes to ensure maximum efficient recovery of oil and
protect correlative rights of owners).
65. See Libecap & Smith, supra note 26, at S590 (stating that “implementation has
not been smooth”); see also Weaver, Spindletop to Enron, supra note 47, at 193
(concluding that in Texas, the only major producing state without compulsory
unitization, oil fields are “imperfectly” and “partially” unitized); UNITED STATES
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FIELD GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF ENHANCED
OIL RECOVERY (Oct. 2000) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-0115-00/fs-0115-00po.pdf
(indicating that enhanced recovery techniques are still too expensive for widespread
use).
66. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, TERMS, supra note 41, at 562 (defining a mineral
interest as “the property interest created in oil and gas after [an] . . . oil and gas
lease”).
67. See id. at 1086 (defining working interest as “[t]he operating interest under
an oil and gas lease . . . [whose] owner . . . has the exclusive right to exploit the
minerals on the land”).
68. See infra note 84 (illustrating the centrality of allocation formulas to
unitization agreements).
69. See John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization,
46 LA. L. REV. 843, 845 (1985-86) (illustrating this point with the hypothetical
situation of an individual who needs the money in the short-term and cannot wait for
the long term benefits of unitization, but whose interests are overridden by society’s
interest in conservation); see also Carr, supra note 10, at 21-4 (noting that “those who
own interests subject to unitization are often faced with the loss of operational
control and a short-term reduction of profits while they wait for long-term gains”);
Merrill, supra note 31, at 407 (describing unitization as “limited scale . . . enforced
communism, with a vengeance”).
70. See William Lutz, Unitization Sparks Controversy in Railroad Commission
Sunset, LONE STAR REP., Apr. 20, 2001, at 8, available at http://www.lonestarreport.
org/newsletters/pdf/010420.pdf (quoting Texas State Senator Chris Harris, an
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they “prize independence and complete control of their own
71
operations.” However, because compulsory unitization is a valid use
of state police powers, these types of objections carry little or no
72
weight before the commissions and the courts.
Mineral interest owners are more difficult to convince of the
73
Some mineral interest
benefits of unitization than operators.
owners believe that unitization allows usurpation of their rights by
working interests. A landowner may oppose a unitization plan out of
anger at an operator for including the landowner’s tract without
74
consultation, or suspicion of the operator’s purpose in joining a
75
unit.
On the working interest side, an operator may refuse to ratify a
unitization plan to avoid being forced to assume their share of the
76
high costs involved in some types of unit operations. Several statutes
opponent of compulsory unitization in Texas, as saying he saw unitization as a
“violation of property rights”); Patricia Muir, Letter to the Editor, Against Forced
Unity in Oil Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1999, at T4, available at ProQuest, Doc.
No. 39778503 (arguing that unitization “negates [royalty owners’] freedom to own
and control private property as protected by the Constitution of the United States”).
But see Kaveler, supra note 16, at 333 (arguing that “[u]nit operation of an oil pool is
consistent with the American system of free enterprise, with the American system of
law and with the American concept of the rights of individuals.”).
71. Weaver, Armtwisting, supra note 48, at 4-6 (listing “pride of ownership and
control” as one of the obstacles to voluntary unitization); see also Murray & Cross,
supra note 8, at 1115 (discussing psychological barriers to unitization such as pride in
control of oil operation); Whittier, supra note 49, at 310 (listing “rugged
individualism of the oil operators” as one of the main barriers to voluntary
unitization) (citations omitted).
72. See Bruce M. Kramer, Pooling and Unitization Orders—Application of
Administrative Law Principles, 34 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 259, 263 (1983)
[hereinafter Kramer, Administrative Law] (“In all instances in which compulsory
pooling and unitization statutes were attacked as unconstitutional per se, they have
been upheld as valid exercises of the police power.”).
73. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 82 (noting that ”[l]essors
who have heard horror stories about the evils of unitization are especially difficult to
convince”); see also Eckman, supra note 19, at 358 (discussing that Maine’s tiered
ratification provision, which lowers the ratification percentage for mineral interest
owners, recognizes that mineral interest owners’ ratification is harder to get than
that of working interest owners).
74. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 82 (describing the
hypothetical case of a landowner who fails to read his lease before signing and then
becomes upset when his tract is included in a unit through a unitization clause in the
lease, which allows the operator to proceed in a unitization agreement on his
behalf).
75. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 382 P.2d 743, 745 (Okla.
1963) (recounting the opponent’s argument that the unitization agreement was a
scheme to “avoid the lessee’s failure to produce”); see Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-4
n.4 (noting that some mineral interest owners suspect unitization is a ploy by
operators to hold on to leases without performing their duty to fully develop the
field).
76. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 89 (indicating that the high
costs of enhanced recovery operations can be a deterrent to operators, particularly if
they believe that the proponents of the unitization plan have “grossly

WIGINTON

1816

9/12/2006 3:48:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1801

address this concern by allowing “free-riders” to avoid the costs of
enhanced recovery entirely, while most require payment of a “risk
77
penalty,” which is deducted from later production.
One reason for opposing a particular unitization plan that both
working interest and mineral interest owners may share is their own
self-interest in maintaining an advantageous position with regards to
78
their neighbors. Occasionally “holdouts” may attempt to get more
79
concessions out of the agreement by refusing their consent or
benefit from litigation against the unit operations on a number of
80
theories.
Allowing an owner to maintain an advantage over
neighboring property owners or to profit by withholding consent
from a fair agreement constitutes a failure to protect all owners’
correlative rights.
B. Specific Objections to the Allocation Formula
Many non-consenting owners—mineral and working interest
owners who refuse to ratify a unitization proposal—do not object to
underestimated” costs and overestimated potential additional recoveries).
77. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options
in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255 (1986) (surveying state
compulsory unitization statutes with regard to free-rider and risk penalty provisions).
78. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-4 n.4 (stating that many interest owners,
“especially those with highly productive wells in the heart of a field, may believe that
their interests are best served by refusing to share any production with outlying
properties”); see also Leary, supra note 30, at 321 (indicating that small interest
owners would not voluntarily join a fair agreement for a variety of reasons, including
the need for profit in the short-term); Payne, supra note 40, at 407 (noting that
owners base their notions of fairness by comparing their present income to that
proposed after unitization). Small independent producers rejected the idea of “fair
share” during the Texas oil boom days because they were profiting
disproportionately from the regulations in place at the time. Jacqueline Lang
Weaver, The Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The Eighty-Six Percent Factor, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 492, 500 (1994) [hereinafter Weaver, Eighty-Six Percent].
79. See Murray & Cross, supra note 8, at 1113 (stating that some owners who
realize that their property is essential to the agreement “may engage in ‘profitable
obstructionism’ holding out with ‘exorbitant demands as the price of their
consent’”); Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual
Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. POL. ECON. 690, 697 (1985)
(on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that some owners may
withhold consent in the negotiation stages to obtain concessions from other parties);
see also Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 781 (Wyo. 1982)
(surmising that the non-consenting owner had opposed the commission’s unitization
order to force a settlement).
80. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 83 (indicating that a few
courts have allowed “holdouts” to collect on trespass, nuisance, and strict liability
theories, while others have not granted relief in cases where the non-consenting
owner was given a “fair opportunity” to join the unit). See generally Ana Boswell
Schepens, Comment, Prospecting for Oil at the Courthouse: Recovery for Drainage Caused
by Secondary Recovery Operations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 603 (1999) (arguing against damage
awards for drainage caused by state-ordered enhanced recovery where the
neighboring interest owners refuse to join the unit).
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the concept of unitization, but are concerned they will not receive
81
Compulsory unitization statutes
their fair share of production.
require that the proposed unitization plan include a formula that
allocates each owner “their fair, equitable and reasonable share of
82
the unit production.”
While favoring unitization, some small
interest owners refuse to consent because they believe that the
83
allocation formula in the agreement is unfair.
The allocation
formula is the most important part of the unitization agreement, the
84
source of most conflicts, and the main barrier to greater unitization.
In theory, the percentage of production allocated to each tract
should be equal to the percentage of oil it contributes to the unit as a
85
whole. The allocation formula is created by petroleum engineers
and geologists and is based on geological, physical, and economic
86
data that operators have collected on the field. To determine the
contribution of each tract to the unit, the formula uses geologic
factors (e.g., surface acreage, acre feet of oil beneath the surface,

81. See Scott B. Cline & Brian J. Stanley, Unitization Formulas Need Scrutiny, OIL &
GAS J., Sept. 13, 1993, at 73 (discussing the need for caution in negotiating
unitization agreements); Smith, supra note 3, at 4-24 (“In many instances,
unitization . . . has not been achieved because of smaller operators’ concerns that
their interests will not be adequately protected.”); see also Payne, supra note 40, at 404
(stating that disagreements arise between the parties over what “fair” participation
means).
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (West 2000).
83. See, e.g, Hatlestad v. Petrocorp Inc., 928 P.2d 295, 296 (Okla. 1996) (stating
that the issues on appeal all related to the fairness of the allocation formula); Eason
Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 535 P.2d 283, 285 (Okla. 1975) (indicating that the nonconsenting party had proposed its own unitization plan and that the party’s
opposition was “directed at the formula for the apportionment and allocation of the
unit production contained in the plan”); Producers Dev. Co. v. Magna Oil Corp., 371
P.2d 702, 702-03 (Okla. 1962) (noting that the non-consenting party did not object
to unitization of their tract, but argued that the allocation formula was unfair).
84. Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 73; see also Smith, supra note 3, at 4-24
(stating that disagreement over the allocation formula is the most common problem
among working interest owners); Eckman, supra note 19, at 359 (stating that the
allocation formula is the most contested issue concerning, and raises the highest
obstacles to, fieldwide unitization); Myers, supra note 9, at 261 (characterizing the
allocation formula as the “heart” of the unitization agreement).
85. See Myers, supra note 9, at 261 (emphasizing that ideally each operator’s share
should be proportionate to his contribution to the unit); Payne, supra note 40, at 404
(defining a “fair plan” as one in which each tract receives a production percentage in
“direct proportion” to the “relative contribution” of the tract to the total amount of
oil and gas produced by the unit).
86. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1411 (10th Cir. 1990)
(stating that the mineral interest owners’ share in New Mexico is “based on a pro rata
share of the production attributable to its land” and the working interest owners’
share is “based on a participation formula calculated from geological, physical and
economic data”); see also Gene E. Roark, Matters of Mutual Concern to the Lawyer and
Engineer in the Unitization Agreement, 7 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 275, 287-88
(1956) (describing the engineer’s role in creating the allocation formula as
determining the “relative value” of each tract in a unit).

WIGINTON

1818

9/12/2006 3:48:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1801

porosity) and production factors (e.g., current production, number of
87
wells, projected primary and secondary recovery). The factors used
in any given formula will vary depending on the characteristics of the
reservoir and the conditions of production at the time of
88
unitization.
The allocation of production may also determine the cost
89
allocation for working interests, the operation voting rights given to
90
each operator, and the voting percentages of each interest owner in
91
the ratification. For example, if an allocation formula sets a tract’s
production share at ten percent, then the operator would be
responsible for ten percent of the costs of the unit and have ten
percent of the vote in a unit committee or similar body. Additionally,
87. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (West 2000) (listing a number of potential
factors and providing for any other factors reasonably necessary to determine the
contribution of the tract); see also Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-5 (highlighting a
number of factors often used in the formulas, including “acreage of each tract, the
net acre feet of pay and the volume of oil in place beneath each tract, the differences
in porosity within the field, current production, cumulative production, the
projected primary recovery from each well”); Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 93
(listing common factors used in allocation formulas and giving five example
formulas); Payne, supra note 40, at 404-05 (listing traditional factors such as
“[p]roductive surface acres, number of producing wells, oil and gas production rate
prior to unitization”); WILLIAMS & MEYERS, LAW, supra note 22, § 970.1 (listing nine of
the “numerous and complex variables in determination of the value of a tract”). See
generally Horner, supra note 44 (discussing the principle factors for allocating
production and various methods for calculating them).
88. See Eason Oil Co., 535 P.2d at 287 (noting that the factors listed in the statute
are “legislative guidelines,” not mandates, in its holding that the five factors used in
the allocation formula at issue were proper); see also Wendell J. Doggett, Practical
Legal Problems Encountered in the Formation, Operation and Dissolution of Fieldwide Oil and
Gas Units, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1963) (indicating that allocation formulas “are
limited only by the imagination of the engineers and geologists who concoct them”).
89. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (2005) (“The order . . . shall also make
provision for the proportionate allocation to the owners . . . of the costs and
expenses of unit operation . . . .”); see also Smith, Kansas II, supra note 55, at 143
(stating that most unitization statutes require that cost allocation equal production
allocation, but not the Kansas statute). Some states, such as Oklahoma, do not
require equal cost and production allocations. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4
(West 2000). However, as a rule, production and cost allocations for each tract
should be identical. See Libecap & Smith, supra note 50, at 596 (arguing that
unequal cost and production allocations are not in keeping with the fundamental
principle of “unitized development” and can lead to “intense conflict” between the
parties).
90. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-110 (2005) (“Provides that each owner shall have
a vote in the supervision and conduct of unit operations corresponding to the
percentage of costs of unit operations chargeable against the interests of such
person . . . .”).
91. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (2005) (“At least three-fourths of the owners
and three-fourths of the royalty owners . . . such three-fourths to be in interest as
determined under [the allocation of production subsection] hereof, shall have
approved the plan and terms of unit operation . . . .”); see also Payne, supra note 40, at
405 (concluding that the production formulas for determining voting percentages
are more representative of the economic interest than the area formulas).
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the operator and mineral interest owner would each have ten percent
of the vote to ratify the plan. If either owner believes he should
receive a greater percentage of production, he will also feel he has a
less than fair vote in the ratification. Thus, the allocation formula
not only affects each owner’s share of production, but also affects all
of the important elements of the unitization, including ratification of
the plan.
C. The Unitization Procedure: Inherent Disadvantages, Conflicting Experts,
and Preeminence of Conservation Result in the Perception of Unfairness
Some small interest owners suspect the proponents of a unitization
agreement of skewing the allocation formula in their favor. At the
same time, these owners are aware that commissions will usually
order unitization without modification, even when conflicting
92
evidence is presented.
These aspects combine to create the
perception that the unitization process is inherently unfair.
1. Negotiating the unitization plan: disadvantages inherent in the position of
the small interest owner
Small interest owners’ distrust of major operators and their belief
that they have a disadvantaged position may partially be attributed to
the history of the oil industry. Before government regulation became
commonplace, major operators, with a monopoly over pipeline
93
transportation, discriminated against small operators by giving
preference to their own production in times of depressed prices,
94
leaving small producers without a market for their oil. The history
of unfair treatment of small interest owners in unit operations may
also serve as a basis for small operators and mineral interest owners’
suspicions that major operators controlling the unit will not treat
95
them fairly.
92. See Anderson & Smith, supra note 7, at 87 (describing how conservation
agencies are not equipped to determine which formula best protects correlative
rights and are therefore reluctant to require a change that may not meet the
ratification requirement).
93. See Weaver, Eighty-Six Percent, supra note 78, at 497-98 (discussing historical
factors that instilled independent oil producers of Texas with a distrust of major oil
companies, which still exists today).
94. See McDonald, supra note 16, at 313-14 (arguing that past discrimination
should not lead small interest owners to believe that major operators will
discriminate in a similar way under unit operations because it would not be
profitable).
95. Weaver, Armtwisting, supra note 48, at 4-6 (“Instances of unfair treatment of
minority participants by the majority of unit members have caused some royalty
owners and small operators to distrust unitization in principle.”); see also LaMaster,
supra note 69, at 845 (noting that some criticisms of unit production target major
operators’ administrative problems); McDonald, supra note 16, at 313 (discussing the
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From the outset of the unitization process, small interest owners
may believe that the superior bargaining power of proponents of the
96
plan will result in an unfair allocation of production. Additionally,
proponents may withhold information to avoid supplying other
interest owners with information that could be used to argue against
97
their proposed allocation formula. The research and analysis used
to create the allocation formula may be based on “proprietary
98
information” that is only available to the proponent’s own experts.
At the same time, financial constraints may prevent small interest
owners from performing the type of fieldwide research and analysis
99
that forms the basis for allocation formulas. In at least one state,
operators may refuse to disclose the information used to calculate the
allocation formula to mineral interest owners seeking to challenge
100
the proposal.
Even when proponent operators share information, the ease of
adjusting the formula in one party’s favor may lead to doubts about
101
its reliability.
The complexity of the formula and imperfect
knowledge about the reservoir may allow the proponents to skew the

reasons many small operators would prefer to continue with the present system,
including the belief that major oil companies do not adequately consider their
interests).
96. See Smith, supra note 3, at 4-24 (listing one of the reasons small operators
oppose unitization as their “lack [of] bargaining clout . . . to negotiate a modification
in the allocation formula proposed by the principal operators within the field”);
Thomas, supra note 19, at 520 (highlighting the perceptions of small operators that
large companies controlling unitization programs are in a superior position to
bargain and do not appreciate the small operators’ needs, discussed in an interview
with John Davenport, Chief Counsel for Texas Independent Producers and Royalty
Owners Association, in Austin, Texas, June 25, 1965).
97. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (indicating that small interest owners
must often request the engineering report, that proponents might not even create
one or intentionally leave it out of the information packets provided to owners, and
that proponents will often include the allocation percentages without including the
formula).
98. Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 79, at 696-97 (highlighting the difference in
the perceived reliability of privately versus publicly held information).
99. See Smith, supra note 3, at 4-24 (noting that small operators’ lack of “field
research” is another barrier in negotiating a modified allocation formula); Cline &
Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (highlighting the cost-benefit dilemma small interest
owners face when deciding whether to perform an independent analysis or rely on
the proponents calculations); see also Weaver, Armtwisting, supra note 48, at 4-6
(noting that “[i]t takes time and money” to develop a unitization plan and allocation
formula).
100. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d 1405, 1413 (10th Cir. 1990)
(concluding that the operator had no duty “to produce and disclose geologic facts to
a [mineral interest owner] comparing the [owner’s] mineral interests to those in the
rest of the unit”).
101. See Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 79, at 697 (stating that the information
used to create an allocation formula “can be easily misrepresented and may not be
considered reliable by other firms”).
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102

formula in their favor.
Thus, from the disadvantaged position of
the small interest owner, it appears that allowing unitization
proponents to create the formula, at worst, gives them an opportunity
to manipulate the formula and, at least, raises questions about its
reliability.
2. Losing the battle of the experts: conflicting duties of the commission create
doubts about neutrality
Disputes over the proper factors and the validity of information
used to calculate the allocation formula may lead to a breakdown in
negotiations and eventually a battle of experts in a hearing before the
103
conservation commission. Conflicts may arise over the accuracy of
104
the data used in the formula, which property should be included in
105
106
or excluded from the unit which factors to use in the formula,
107
Differences in
and how much weigh each factor should be given.
the data on the field held by various operators may cause disputes

102. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 73 (noting that while the formulas are
based on sound data in theory, this is not always the case in practice); LaMaster,
supra note 69, at 853 (stating that “[n]egotiations of these complex formulae may
allow larger interests or parties with expertise in these areas to adjust factors in their
favor”); see also Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (providing five examples of very
different allocation formulas for fields with similar geology as a warning to owners to
be wary of proponents’ “calculations”); Murray & Cross, supra note 8, at 1113-14
(noting that there is “an incentive to cheat on any cooperative agreement” such as
unitization).
103. See Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 79, at 696 (discussing “subjective geological
variables” that create problems in unitization negotiations).
104. See Bishop v. Corp. Comm’n, 394 P.2d 235, 237 (Okla. 1963) (discussing the
different estimates of acre feet of sand); Chenoweth v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
382 P.2d 743, 745 (Okla. 1963) (noting conflicting estimates of acre feet of sand);
Producers Dev. Co. v. Magna Oil Corp., 371 P.2d 702, 703 (Okla. 1962) (noting
differing estimates of net economically recoverable primary production); Spiers v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 244 P.2d 843, 847 (Okla. 1951) (recounting a
disagreement between experts due to insufficient data on the field).
105. See Hatlestad v. Petrocorp Inc., 928 P.2d 295, 296 (Okla. 1996) (noting the
argument that the data should not have included neighboring non-productive land);
Jones v. Cont’l Oil Co., 420 P.2d 905, 907 (Okla. 1966) (discussing plaintiff’s
argument that the unitization plan should not have included plaintiff’s productive
land).
106. See Jones, 429 P.2d at 910 (noting plaintiff’s opposition to the data because of
the period year of production used to calculate the formula).
107. See Eason Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 535 P.2d 283, 287 (Okla. 1975) (noting
opponents’ argument that there was “too much stress on present production and not
enough importance placed on acre feet”); see also Scott B. Cline, Spreadsheets Simplify
Oil Field Unitization Calculations, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 28, 1995, at 88 (noting the
difficultly in reaching agreement on the weight of each factor because of their highly
subjective nature); Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 73 (discussing problems that
arise in negotiating the factors to be used in an allocation formula); Smith, Kansas II,
supra note 55, at 140 (noting that while there are several advantages to single factor
formulas, such as surface area, they are also “highly unsophisticated and almost
certainly unfair”).
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108

between the parties.
Reasonable disagreements between qualified
experts over the proper factors to include in a formula are not
109
uncommon. However, it is the treatment of conflicting evidence by
the commission that leads small interest owners to view the process as
biased towards major operators.
Conservation commissions’ duty to prevent waste and place in the
process as an interested party contributes to the perception that the
compulsory unitization process results in unfair treatment of small
interest owners.
While unitization prevents waste, an unfair
allocation formula harms correlative rights. Thus, an allocation
formula of questionable fairness creates a conflict between the
110
commission’s duties to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.
When this conflict arises, the commission’s duty to prevent waste
111
supersedes its duty to protect the rights of small interest owners.
Faced with conflicting evidence, commissions generally order
unitization based on the testimony of the applicant’s expert
112
witnesses.
At the same time, the state, through its conservation
108. See Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 79, at 697 (noting a finding in their study
of unitization in Wyoming, Texas, and Oklahoma that “information issues”
repeatedly stalled negotiations). But see Payne, supra note 40, at 403 (indicating that
the further developed a field is, the greater the chance there will be agreement
between the petroleum engineers and the geologists over interpretation of the data).
109. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (cautioning that a demand for “more
than reasonableness” may prevent unitization altogether); Smith, Kansas II, supra
note 55, at 141 (noting that unanimous agreement on the factors and the weight
given to each in a formula does not exist among experts).
110. Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74.
111. See Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 779 (Wyo.
1982) (stating that the prevention of waste is of primary importance and noting that
“substantial waste cannot be countenanced by a slavish devotion to correlative
rights”); Denver Producing & Ref. Co. v. State, 184 P.2d 961, 964 (Okla. 1947)
(stating that correlative rights “must yield . . . to a reasonable exercise [of
conservation]”); see also IOGCC MODEL ACT, supra note 29, § 2 (advocating statutory
language explicitly stating that “[i]n the event of a conflict between the duty to
prevent waste and the duty to protect correlative rights, the primary duty of the
[commission] is to prevent waste in a manner that will protect correlative rights to
the extent reasonably possible given the [commission’s] primary duty.”); Anderson &
Smith, Playing Field, supra note 5, at 286 (noting that with regard to the allocation
formula, the conservation agency is “more likely to be concerned about orderly
development and preventing waste”); Weaver, Armtwisting, supra note 48, at 4-3
(indicating that conservation is the preeminent concern of conservation agencies
because it “is generally considered of greater public interest and value than the goal
of distributing the pie fairly among its owners”).
112. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (advising small interest owners not to
“rely too heavily on the state for protection” in light of the commission’s duty to
prevent waste); see, e.g., Hatlestad v. Petrocorp Inc., 928 P.2d 295, 297 (Okla. 1996)
(indicating that the administrative judge who heard eight days of extensive testimony
favored the opponents plan, yet the appellate administrative law judge and the
commission found for the applicant); Chenoweth v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 382
P.2d 743, 745 (Okla. 1963) (noting that both sides used technical expert evidence
and that the commission accepted the evidence presented by the applicant);
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commission, is also an interested party to the compulsory unitization
process because it affects the development of the state’s interest in its
113
natural resources. The failure of challenges to unitization because
of the preeminence of the duty to prevent waste creates the
impression that the commission simply “rubberstamps” unitization
114
plans for its own benefit.
In addition to a commission’s duty to prevent waste, other
limitations restrict the actions a commission can take to resolve
conflicting evidence. While commissions may have the authority to
115
modify the allocation formula, they are not required to do so and
116
Most
generally approve the plan submitted by the applicant.
conservation commissions do not have the staff and funding to fully
evaluate the various competing, highly technical plans and allocation
117
formulas.
Negotiations can result in owners proposing a large
number of plans, further taxing the staff and resources of the
118
commission.

Producers Dev. Co. v. Magna Oil Corp., 371 P.2d 702, 703 (Okla. 1962)
(acknowledging that the opponent experts presented contradictory evidence); Spiers
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 244 P.2d 843, 848 (Okla. 1952) (noting both sides had
qualified experts with similar testimony, but that the commission placed “great
credence” on the testimony of the applicant experts).
113. See Carr, supra note 10, at 21-5 (describing the commission’s role in
compulsory unitization proceedings as balancing the state’s interest against the rights
of the interest owners).
114. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93 (“The mere rumor that
the agency will simply rubberstamp the submitted plan and the proposed allocation
formula increases skepticism of many working interest and royalty owners
concerning unitization.”).
115. Oklahoma law states that:
[T]he Commission . . . shall make . . . an order creating the unit and
providing for the unitization and unitized operation of the common source
of supply or portion thereof described in the order, all upon such terms and
conditions, as may be shown by the evidence to be fair, reasonable, equitable
and which are necessary or proper to protect, safeguard and adjust the
respective rights and obligations of the several persons affected . . . .
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.3 (West 2000).
116. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-7 (noting that while the commission has the
authority to order modifications, in most cases it approves the plan as submitted).
117. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 89; see Gray & Swan, supra note
55, at 441 (arguing against the idea of commission-initiated unitization because
commissions lack sufficient engineering staff and funds to develop their own
unitization plans).
118. See Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 642 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo.
1982) (noting that the owners created at least sixty-seven formulas, voted on nearly
sixty of them, and still failed to reach the eighty percent consent needed for
unitization); see also Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 89 (listing some
working interest owners’ questions regarding anticipated profit and recovery and
allocation of costs as reasons they might not have confidence in the success of a
unitization project for enhanced recovery).
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There has not been a great deal of litigation on the use of
119
One potential reason for this is the
compulsory unitization.
substantial evidence standard used in judicial review of unitization
orders. In most states, courts must give at least substantial deference
to the conservation commission in deciding whether a unitization
120
plan meets all of the statutory requirements.
The court’s role in
reviewing an order of the commission is not to weigh the evidence
presented to the commission, but to determine if there is substantial
121
evidence to support the order.
Thus, small interest owners
understand that the courts, like the commission, offer little
protection to their right to a fair share of production.
122
One Oklahoma case, Bishop v. Corporation Commission, illustrates
how a commission’s reliance on the proponents’ experts can result in
an unfair allocation formula. In Bishop, two large operators proposed
123
a unitization agreement that included the Bishop family’s tract. At
the commission hearing, the Bishops’ expert witness testified that the
allocation formula was based on a miscalculation of the productive
feet of sand under the Bishops’ tract and that they were entitled to
124
more than double the percentage of production in the formula.
Despite the conflicting evidence, the commission approved the
125
Three months after the order, the
proponents’ plan as proposed.
commission held another hearing on an application to amend the
126
order to make it effective immediately.
During the hearing, an
expert for the proponent corroborated the evidence that the
Bishops’ expert had previously presented, but the commission
127
refused to modify the formula.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme
119. See Eckman, supra note 19, at 353 (suggesting three reasons for the dearth of
litigation on unitization, including the idea that compulsory unitization is only used
for “the most profitable, hence least objectionable, unitization projects”).
120. See, e.g., Trees Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Kan. 2005)
(noting that the “power of review . . . does not give the court authority to substitute
its judgment for that of the Commission”); Superior Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 242
P.2d 454, 458 (Okla. 1952) (stating that the court “cannot substitute [its] judgment
on disputed questions of fact unless the findings of the commission are not as
commanded by the Constitution, supported by the law, and substantial evidence”);
Gilmore, 642 P.2d at 776 (stating that the court “will not substitute [its] judgment for
that of the agency”). See generally Kramer, Administrative Law, supra note 72
(discussing the various scopes of judicial review of commission decisions in Texas,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma).
121. Trees Oil Co., 105 P.3d at 1278; Gilmore, 642 P.2d at 776; Producers Dev. Co. v.
Magna Oil Corp., 371 P.2d 702, 703 (Okla. 1962).
122. 394 P.2d 235 (Okla. 1964).
123. Id. at 235-36.
124. Id. at 237.
125. Id. at 236.
126. Id. at 237.
127. Id.
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Court eventually reversed the commission’s order in Bishop, the
case sends a message to small interest owners that the only way to win
the battle of experts is to have the proponents’ experts testify that
129
their own formula is unfair.
In sum, although unitization is heralded as the most effective
method to conserve oil while protecting correlative rights, in practice,
the unitization process creates an adversarial relationship between
parties and their experts. Cases like Bishop demonstrate the reason
small interest owners are wary of plans presented by major operators,
believe that the commission will not protect their rights, and know
that they cannot win the battle of the experts. These factors create a
perception of unfairness, which poses a major challenge to greater
unitization. In response to this challenge, legislatures must correct
the process to assure small interest owners that they will receive their
fair share.
III. NEUTRAL EXPERTS
In 1984, Professor Owen L. Anderson proposed a list of reforms to
address the concerns of unitization opponents, including the
suggestion that commissions hire an “outside consultant” to provide
an “independent report on the fairness of the formulas [that] should
lessen the fears of interest owners who feel that their correlative
130
rights are not being protected.”
This Part seeks to develop his
proposal by first looking at the context for appointing neutral experts
where party experts present conflicting scientific evidence and at the
existing authority of courts, federal agencies, and conservation
commissions to appoint neutral experts to review evidence. Then,
this Part will examine and apply some of the justifications for and
criticisms of appointing neutral experts in the compulsory unitization
context.
A. The Context for Appointing Experts: Party Presentation of Conflicting
Scientific Evidence
Appointing neutral experts to review the scientific evidence used to
create and justify allocation formulas may serve to change small
128. See id. at 238 (reversing the Commission’s unitization order because it was not
supported by substantial evidence).
129. But see Eckman, supra note 19, at 360 (stating that current regulations afford
protection to small interest owners through the commission’s approval process and
each ratifying party’s “careful scrutiny of the information”).
130. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 13-72 to -73 (suggesting that implementation of
these proposed reforms should result in a substantial reduction or abandonment of
the ratification provisions).
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131

interest owners’ perceptions of unitization.
The use of scientific
evidence challenges decisionmakers to comprehend and weigh the
132
merits of potentially complex technical information. Party experts
compound this challenge by presenting conflicting or incomplete
133
evidence.
The challenges scientific evidence presents courts with
134
The adversary
result from the operation of the adversary system.
system is unsuited to scientific evidence because it encourages parties
to hire experts who will testify favorably, instead of on the basis of
135
their scientific knowledge and expertise.
Courts and regulatory agencies have the authority to appoint
neutral experts in cases where scientific evidence demands an
unbiased review. Congress drafted Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to
136
codify courts’ inherent power to appoint experts to testify.
Congress has given federal regulatory agencies broad authority to
hire independent experts to review evidence in adjudications and
137
implement independent peer review in agency rulemaking.
With
regard to compulsory unitization proceedings, some state
conservation agencies have the authority to appoint neutral experts
to hear, review, or present evidence, although this authority is
138
seldom, if ever, used.
131. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93 (suggesting a two-step
hearing process that includes review of the plan and formula by an independent
consultant to help decrease “the skepticism of many working interest and royalty
owners concerning unitization”).
132. See Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 60 (1998) (identifying the challenges posed to
judges and juries after “complex expert testimony has passed a preliminary test for
reliability and been admitted”).
133. Id. at 61; see also Note, Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1589 (1994-95) [hereinafter Harvard,
Developments] (discussing the use of court-appointed experts in cases of “dueling
experts or [failure] to present the facts adequately”).
134. See Deason, supra note 132, at 61 (stating that the appointment of experts
contravenes one of the basic principles of the zealous advocacy system); Harvard,
Developments, supra note 133, at 1589 (noting that dueling experts and incomplete
evidence are a result of “the nature of the adversarial process”).
135. See Deason, supra note 132, at 66 (discussing early criticisms of adversary
system’s treatment of scientific evidence, which led to proposals for court-appointed
experts); Dan L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science,
33 JURIMETRICS J. 363, 365-67 (1992-93) (contrasting the professional norms of the
adversary legal system with the professional norms of an unbiased and cohesive
scientific community); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1188
(characterizing the “dangers of adversarial expertise” as beginning with the selection
of biased experts followed by their compensation and preparation, which creates
more bias).
136. See Deason, supra note 132, at 73-74 (discussing the history of reform that led
to the creation of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 in 1975).
137. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the authority of federal regulatory agencies to
appoint independent experts).
138. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the existing authority of conservation
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1. Court-appointed expert witnesses
Since the early twentieth century, courts have been searching for a
139
solution to the problems that scientific-expert testimony creates.
Federal courts have broad discretion in appointing neutral experts as
expert witnesses and technical advisors in cases where scientific
140
evidence poses a challenge to decisionmakers. Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 706, “[t]he court may on its own motion or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert
141
witnesses should not be appointed . . . .”
The popularity of the
142
concept of court-appointed experts has grown over the years,
commissions to appoint neutral experts in compulsory unitization proceedings).
139. See Deason, supra note 132, at 66 (discussing early proposals for courtappointed experts based on “concern for the functioning of the jury” and a “general
dissatisfaction with expert opinion testimony”).
140. See id. at 75 (stating that federal courts have authority under Rule 706 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to appoint expert witnesses in addition to inherent
authority to appoint neutral expert witnesses and technical advisors); see also Si-Hung
Choy, Comment, Judicial Education After Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: The
Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1423, 1427-29 (2000) (distinguishing
the appointment of “expert witnesses” under Rule 706 from the appointment of
“technical advisors” under inherent power of judges); Note, Improving Judicial
Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947
(1996-97) [hereinafter Harvard, Gatekeeping] (discussing Rule 706 and the inherent
authority of the courts as the sources of judicial authority to appoint experts). This
Comment focuses on the role of neutral experts as witnesses under Rule 706.
Technical advisors are experts who do not contribute evidence, perform
independent fact-finding, or give their own opinions on the merits of the case. See
Harvard, Gatekeeping, supra, at 948 (highlighting the limited authority under Rule 706
in appointing technical advisors). In major oil-producing states, professional
petroleum engineers and geologists staff the commissions and provide technical
expertise to the members of the commission. KRAMER & MARTIN, UNITIZATION, supra
note 28, at 4-2 (3d ed. 1996). Additionally, commission members, unlike judges,
develop experience and knowledge in oil and gas matters while serving on the
commission. See Choy, supra, at 1444 (highlighting the differences between the role
of technical advisors and that of law clerks). In states such as New Mexico, the
commission itself is composed of experts. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Heimann, 904 F.2d
1405, 1415-16 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that the state statute requires that in the New
Mexico Oil Conservation Commission sit “two designated members . . . ‘who have
expertise in the regulation of petroleum production by virtue of education or
training,’ . . . while the third member must either be a registered petroleum
engineer or else, by virtue of education and experience, have experience in
petroleum engineering”) (citations omitted).
141. FED. R. EVID. 706(a). It is also within the court’s discretion to refuse to
appoint an expert even in cases when evidence presented by parties is in “extreme
variation.” Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 531-32 (1st ed. 1994), available at http://
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/13.expert.pdf/$File/13.expert.pdf [hereinafter
Cecil & Willging, Court-Appointed].
142. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note (indicating that despite
criticism of court-appointed experts, “the trend is increasingly to provide for their
use”); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1015
(1994) [hereinafter Cecil & Willging, Invitation] (concluding from their survey of
judges for the Federal Judicial Center that, given the right circumstances, almost all
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although actual appointments remain “a relatively infrequent
143
occurrence.”
144
In
Courts have applied Rule 706 in a wide range of contexts.
145
Students of California School for the Blind v. Honig, the court appointed
a neutral expert in a case involving complex scientific evidence on
seismic safety claims over the proposed construction site of a school
146
for disabled children.
During the trial, numerous experts
presented “highly contradictory” testimony on the seismic safety of
147
the proposed school. The court found for the defendants on other
claims, but “was unable to decide the seismic safety claims on the
148
basis of evidence presented at trial.” The court reopened the case
and appointed a neutral expert to determine whether the state had
149
adequately tested the proposed site. The judge stated that a ruling
for the defendants “did not seem fair because [they] had denied
access to the type of testing that might be necessary to prove or
150
disprove plaintiffs’ claim.” Following completion of his own study,
the neutral expert concurred with the plaintiff’s experts that the
151
earlier studies were inadequate and recommended further tests.

judges would consider appointing experts); see also Gross, supra note 135, at 1189-90
(indicating that revisions of Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence reflect increasing favor
to the concept of court-appointed experts).
143. FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note. The reason for the lack of actual
appointments may be the “sobering effect” the possibility of an appointment has on
the parties and their experts. Id.; see also Cecil & Willging, Court-Appointed, supra note
141, at 530 (listing the conclusions from a survey of judges on their uneasiness with
court-appointed experts, including difficulty in accommodating scientists in the
adversarial court system).
144. See Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1006 (stating that “medical
experts appointed in personal injury cases, engineering experts appointed in patent
and trade secret cases, and accounting experts appointed in commercial cases”
accounted for almost two-thirds of the appointments made by judges surveyed in
their study); Deason, supra note 132, at 87-89 (noting that courts have used
independent experts from numerous professions, including engineers, scientists,
accountants, doctors, lawyers, and economists).
145. 736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S. 148 (1985).
146. Id.; see Deason, supra note 132, at 94 (citing Honig as a case involving
“technological complexity [and] scientific uncertainty where the need for a careful
decision is heightened by a public interest dimension”) (736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.
1984)); Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1011 (summarizing, in an
interview with the Honig district judge, his need for a court-appointed expert after
the parties’ experts became advocates for their side).
147. Honig, 736 F.2d at 541.
148. Id. The district judge characterized the party experts as “[o]utstanding . . . in
the field” and their testimony as “in bitter opposition to each other.” Cecil &
Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1011.
149. Honig, 736 F.2d at 541.
150. Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1011.
151. See Honig, 736 F.2d at 548 (holding that the district court’s finding that the
seismic tests were inadequate based on the neutral expert testimony was not clearly
erroneous).
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After these tests eliminated the possibility of seismic danger, the
152
judge refused to enjoin construction on the site.
2. Federal agencies’ appointment of neutral experts in adjudication and use of
independent peer-review in rulemaking
Compared to federal courts, federal agency appointment of neutral
153
experts is more common. Unlike courts, the authority of a federal
agency to appoint neutral experts to participate in adjudication or
rulemaking is limited to the procedures set out by the Administrative
154
Procedure Act and the powers granted in the agency’s enabling
155
statute. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal agency
has the authority to appoint neutral experts to review evidence in
adjudication as long as the agency provides the parties with notice
156
and opportunity to participate.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources
157
Council indicates that independent experts can play an important
role in agency decisionmaking through reviewing evidence. In
Marsh, the Court upheld a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers
not to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement on a
dam project to review new information presented by four nonprofit
158
corporations.
The Court seemed to emphasize that the Corps’
decision to hire two independent experts to evaluate the new
information, in addition to its own experts’ evaluations, was an
important factor supporting the Corps’ determination that one of the
159
new documents did not present significant new information.
152. Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1011.
153. See Gross, supra note 135, at 1205 (comparing the limited use of neutral
experts in courts to the common practice of appointing neutral medical experts in
worker compensation proceedings); see also Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”:
Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1049
(2000) (noting that “[a]s compared to legislatures and courts, administrative
agencies seem institutionally best equipped to understand and assimilate scientific
information.”); Gross, supra note 135, at 1206 (listing the factors that make using
neutral experts in workers’ compensation cases easier and more prevalent than in
court, including the use of administrative law judges instead of juries, the less formal
nature of the hearing, and the use of written reports as opposed to oral testimony).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2000).
155. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, at 107 (3d ed. 1994) (“Every agency decision must be anchored in the
language of one or more statutes the agency is charged to implement.”).
156. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000) (“The employee who presides at the reception of
evidence . . . may not . . . consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice
and opportunity for all parties to participate . . . .”).
157. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
158. Id. at 385.
159. See id. at 383 (“Moreover, in disputing the accuracy and significance of this
information, the Corps did not simply rely on its own experts. Rather, two
independent experts hired by the Corps to evaluate the ODFW study on which the
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Subsequent lower court decisions also indicate the important role of
160
independent experts in supporting agency decisionmaking.
In another adjudicatory setting, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) responded to calls from scientists in the early 1980s for
greater use of experts to resolve scientific disputes by creating a
161
Public Board of Inquiry (“PBOI”) to review challenges to its
162
product approval decisions. Although the FDA only used PBOIs in
163
two cases before abandoning the idea, the process has been
recommended to other federal agencies as a method of considering
164
scientific evidence.
Similarly, in recent years, regulatory agencies have begun using
non-governmental peer review bodies when “making decisions in the
165
face of scientific uncertainty.”
The Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) has employed independent experts to review its

Cramer Memorandum was premised found significant fault in the methodology and
conclusions of the study.”). Although the Court seemed to place some degree of
importance on the use of independent experts, it also held that “an agency must
have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts. . . .”
Id. at 378. The holding suggests that the Corps could have supported its decision on
the basis of its own experts’ opinions alone.
160. See, e.g., Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
Environmental Statement prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency and
Department of Transportation that incorporated studies from various independent
experts in addition to other support, complied with the National Environmental
Protection Act); Kroger Co. v. Reg’l Airport Auth., 286 F.3d 382, 390-91 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that the determinations of the agency’s expert consultants supported
the Regional Airport Authority’s decision to deny a full reimbursement of
management wages to Kroger, and, therefore, the decision was not arbitrary and
capricious).
161. See Noah, supra note 153, at 1056 (noting that use of Public Boards of Inquiry
(“PBOI”) “represent adjudicatory instead of rulemaking proceedings”); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA’s
Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 290 (“This hearing constitutes formal
adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
162. See Joel E. Hoffman, The FDA’s New Forms of Public Hearing—Choosing Among the
Alternatives, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 330, 335 (1977) (recommending the
appointment of a PBOI when the case involves technologically complex facts). See
generally Shapiro, supra note 161 (analyzing the rationale for the PBOI, application of
the PBOI procedure to the Aspartame and Depo-Provera cases, and the PBOI
process).
163. Noah, supra note 153, at 1056 (indicating that the PBOI procedure was
“cumbersome” and the FDA has “given up on using [it] to resolve scientific
disputes”).
164. See Shapiro, supra note 161, at 342 (advocating the PBOI process for other
agencies that make product safety determinations); see also Noah, supra note 153, at
1056-57 (noting that the Administrative Conference of the United States has called
for further experimentation with panels similar to PBOIs and that Congress has
“called on the FDA to create a dispute resolution mechanism for referring scientific
controversies to expert advisory panels or committees”).
165. See Noah, supra note 153, at 1034 (referencing Congress’s growing interest in
peer review of regulatory reform by independent experts).
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166

decisions on pesticides and pollution-control standards.
The
purpose of the independent Science Advisory Board is to ensure that
167
EPA decisions are based on “unbiased objective scientific opinion.”
3. Conservation agency authority and use of neutral experts in the unitization
process
Like federal regulatory agencies, state statutes and, in some cases,
constitutional provisions establish and grant authority to state
168
conservation agencies.
Statutes limit the authority of conservation
agencies to the powers “expressly granted” and “necessarily implied
169
from those expressly granted.”
The statute that governs the
commission also likely provides the procedures used in compulsory
170
Because compulsory unitization
unitization proceedings.
171
proceedings are adjudications,
the commission must base its
findings solely on the evidence presented at the hearing and “matters
172
that were officially noticed.”
The use of neutral experts in compulsory unitization proceedings
is not an entirely foreign concept to some state conservation
commissions, although the practice does not appear to be very
173
common.
Kansas’ compulsory unitization statute explicitly
166. See id. at 1052-54 (discussing Congress’s creation of the Scientific Advisory
Panel and its codification of the EPA’s Science Advisory Board to assure quality and
credibility in the agency’s decisionmaking).
167. Id. at 1053 (stating that Congress requires the EPA to consult the
independent Scientific Advisory Panel before cancelling pesticide registrations).
168. See Kramer, Administrative Law, supra note 72, at 260 (noting that state
legislatures have provided state conservation agencies with a “substantial amount of
guidance in the exercise of the agency’s delegated authority”); see also KRAMER &
MARTIN, UNITIZATION, supra note 140, at § 4.01 (illustrating the various ways state
conservation agencies are created through examples in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Utah).
169. See Kramer, Administrative Law, supra note 72, at 267 (discussing the
application of the “ultra vires doctrine” to agency actions that exceed the scope of
agency authority); see also KRAMER & MARTIN, UNITIZATION, supra note 140, at § 4.03
(suggesting that in the case of compulsory unitization, state conservation agencies’
discretion is limited).
170. See Kramer, Administrative Law, supra note 72, at 270 (“With . . . unitization
orders, the actual procedures used by the agency in determining whether or not
to . . . unitize are probably set forth in the general procedural rules of the relevant
state agency.”) .
171. See id. at 271 (“The typical . . . unitization proceeding would be an
adjudication under the Model State Administrative Procedure Act since it involves
individual parties, deals with past or present facts, and only applies to those who have
participated in the process.”).
172. See id. at 274-75 (discussing the requirement that agencies make a record of
the proceedings); see also Gray & Swan, supra note 55, at 443 (indicating that the
“quasi-judicial” nature of disputes between private parties over the allocation formula
requires the commission to make findings “based solely upon the evidence presented
to it”).
173. The author searched LEXIS and Westlaw for opinions discussing the use of
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authorizes the Kansas Corporation Commission to appoint a
“qualified disinterested technical consultant” to aid the commission
174
in understanding and assessing the issues and evidence. However,
the commission has not used this provision in any recent cases, and
175
may never have used it.
Several states have provisions in their oil
and gas conservation statutes granting the commission authority to
176
hire consultants as needed to carry out its duties.
Several states, including Wyoming, have statutory provisions that
allow their conservation commissions to appoint “[a]ny member of
the commission, or its staff or any other person” as an examiner to
conduct hearings and make reports and recommendations to the
177
These provisions also provide that the commission
commission.
“may enter orders based on the reports and recommendations of its
178
examiners.” Although not common practice, the Wyoming Oil and
independent or neutral experts in unitization and found none.
174. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1309 (1994). The statute reads:
Employment of consultant to advise commission.
Whenever in any
contested proceeding before the commission for the unitization and unit
operation of a pool or part of a pool, the commission determines that the
engineering, geological, or other technical issues are such that it is in need
of additional engineering, geological or other technical evidence as an aid to
a proper understanding and appraisal of the issues and evidence, it may
employ a qualified disinterested technical consultant for that purpose. All
opinions, conclusions, evidence and testimony of such consultant shall be
presented in an open hearing subject to examination by any interested party
as well as the commission. The cost and expense of the employment of such
a consultant shall be payable out of funds of the commission.
175. Telephone Interview with John McCannon, Assistant General Council,
Kansas Corporation Commission (Feb. 14, 2006) (stating that in his twelve years at
the commission, the commission had never appointed a disinterested technical
consultant, nor had he seen any reference to previous use of the provision). The
author searched LEXIS and Westlaw and found no opinions or other materials citing
the Kansas disinterested technical consultant provision as of [Jan. 1, 2006].
Additionally, in the most recent unitization case to reach the Kansas Supreme Court,
the parties called numerous experts, but the record does not indicate that the
commission employed an outside consultant. Trees Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 105
P.3d 1269, 1273-75 (Kan. 2005).
176. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.023(d) (2004) (“In addition to its staff of
regular employees, the commission may contract for and engage the services of
consultants and experts the commission considers necessary.”); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 34-60-104.5(2)(d) (2005) (“The director of the commission shall . . . [a]ppoint . . .
such clerical and professional staff and consultants as may be necessary for the
efficient and effective operation of the commission . . . .”).
177. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-105 (2005); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-10 (2005);
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 78.52.032 (West 2005). Although a number of states have
provisions for the appointment of hearing officers, many also limit the appointment
to commission members and employees. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-13 (West 1978)
(limiting potential hearing examiners to member of “the commission or the director
of the division or his authorized representative”).
178. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-105 (2005); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-10 (2005);
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 78.52.032 (West 2005). The Wyoming provision was
originally intended to reduce the number of cases before the commission; however,
the right of parties to demand a hearing before the commission lessened its effective
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Gas Commission has appointed hearing examiners who are not
179
members or employees of the commission.
Some oil and gas conservation statutes may allow the commission
to appoint neutral experts through a broad delegation of authority to
180
take any reasonable action necessary to carry out its duties.
One
181
Alabama case, State Oil and Gas Board v. Anderson, demonstrates how
broad agency discretion in formulating procedure might allow
neutral experts to play a role in devising fair and equitable allocation
formulas. During an initial set of hearings, the State Board of Oil
and Gas of Alabama heard testimony from the proponent’s experts
advocating a single-factor allocation formula as well as testimony from
the opponent’s experts proposing several alternative multiple-factor
182
formulas.
After this set of hearings, the Board devised its own
formula and ordered the formation of a “committee of experts” to
183
redetermine the tract participation values based on its new formula.
The expert committee met for three months and, following the
proponent’s submission of a revised application, the Board “heard
more evidence and reviewed the data prepared by the expert
184
committee.”
The Board eventually issued an order to commence
185
unit operations under the plan including its formula, which the
186
Although the Board
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld.
use of examiners as proxy decision makers for the commission. See Houston G.
Williams & George M. Porter, Practice Before the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1975) (indicating that as of 1975,
hearing examiners were only appointed for uncontested matters). But see Cook v. Oil
& Gas Conservation Comm’n, 880 P.2d 583, 584 (Wyo. 1994) (stating that the
hearing examiner in a contested application to expand a unit referred the case to
the Commission because he was unsure about the required approval percentage).
179. Telephone Interview with Rick Marvel, Engineering Supervisor, Wyoming Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission (Mar. 13, 2006) (noting a case in which the
Commission appointed a retired Wyoming Supreme Court Justice to serve as a
hearing examiner).
180. Unlike the Kansas statute, the Alabama statute does not explicitly delegate to
the Board authority to form a committee of experts such as the one created in State
Oil & Gas Board v. Anderson. 510 So. 2d 250, 252 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The Alabama
Board’s power to create a committee of experts likely comes from the broad
delegation of authority to carry out its duties. See ALA. CODE § 9-17-6 (1975) (“The
board shall have the authority and it shall be its duty to make such inquiries as it may
think proper to determine whether or not waste . . . exists or is imminent. In the
exercise of such power the board shall have the authority to . . . [t]ake such action as
may be reasonably necessary to enforce this article.”).
181. 510 So. 2d 250 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987).
182. See id. at 253 (suggesting formulas based on factors such as pore volume,
historical average daily production, productive capacity, and productive acreage).
183. See id. at 252 (discussing the Commission’s actions in the first hearing).
184. Id.
185. See id. at 253 (acknowledging the “ratification of the unit agreement and unit
operating agreement by the statutorily required percentage of interest owners”).
186. See id. (overturning the lower court’s ruling that the Board’s formula was
unsupported by the evidence and noting “the flexibility afforded the State Oil and
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carried out review and recalculation of the allocation formula, the
broad discretion of the Board would likely have allowed it to appoint
187
a neutral expert to do the same.
B. Benefits of Neutral Experts in Compulsory Unitization
1. Use of neutral experts to aid decisionmaking by resolving conflicting
evidence and filling in information gaps
Appointing neutral experts to review evidence presented by parties
in a dispute over unitization may provide the commission with an
unbiased opinion of the evidence, fill in gaps in the evidence and
information presented, and uncover formulas and plans based on
insufficient data on the field. While the professional expert
employees of a commission are equally capable of performing these
functions, a neutral expert may give confidence to skeptical small
interest owners that the commission will thoroughly address their
concerns without draining the personnel resources of the
commission.
Perhaps the most important role for neutral experts in the
unitization process is to provide an objective opinion based on a
more detailed review of the data than a commission is typically able
188
189
to afford the parties. In complex litigation, such as Honig, courtappointed experts provide an independent opinion for the court to
190
consider.
As demonstrated in Marsh, federal agencies may hire
independent experts to evaluate the accuracy of scientific evidence,
191
To resolve conflicting
which will affect agency decisionmaking.
Gas Board in issuing relief pursuant to a petition for unitization”).
187. Telephone Interview with Marvin Rogers, Attorney for the Board, Oil and
Gas Board of Alabama (Mar. 16, 2006) (suggesting that the Board’s discretion in
carrying out its duties is likely broad enough to allow it to appoint a neutral expert in
a compulsory unitization proceeding).
188. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93 (suggesting that an
agency could appoint a neutral expert to make a “meaningful” and objective
evaluation of the proposed plan and allocation formula); see also Lawrence S. Pinsky,
Comment, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to Assist Judges in the
Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 527, 554 (1997-98)
(suggesting that peer review in the courts “places the task of evaluating technical
claims made in the proffered testimony on the shoulders of those presumably most
competent to judge the validity of the methodology and to comment on the nature
of any deficiencies”).
189. 736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1984).
190. See supra note 144 (describing the types of cases where courts have appointed
experts).
191. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 383 (1989)
(indicating that the Army Corps of Engineers hired independent experts to evaluate
evidence presented by opponents of a dam project before making its decision not to
prepare a supplement environmental impact statement).
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evidence in a dispute over an allocation formula, a commission could
use its broad or express authority to appoint an independent expert
to review the formula and testify to its accuracy and fairness at the
hearing.
Similarly, other commissions might appoint an
independent expert as a hearing examiner to receive and review
party evidence at a hearing and then provide the commission with a
written report and recommendations.
Neutral experts could address the problems created when
proponents of a particular unitization plan distribute incomplete or
misleading information. The adversary system creates an incentive
for each side to withhold unfavorable evidence, leaving the
192
decisionmaker with an incomplete picture of the facts.
This
problem may arise in unitization proceedings if a party fails to
present all of the data they have collected while preparing a
193
unitization plan or allocation formula.
Allowing a neutral expert
access to all of the information that exists on a proposed unit from all
parties will help create a complete picture of the field. With a
comprehensive collection of data, the neutral expert and commission
can better determine the accuracy of the proposed formula and make
194
suggestions for modifying it where needed.
Similarly, a neutral expert might identify unitization plans that are
195
based on insufficient data on the reservoir.
Neutral experts
reviewing evidence may recognize a lack of sufficient information to
196
support the claims made by the parties. In compulsory unitization,
a neutral expert review may determine that there is insufficient data

192. See Deason, supra note 132, at 82 (noting that one of the strengths of the
adversary system is that the parties decide what evidence is presented, thereby
maintaining the neutrality of the decisionmaker, but this becomes a drawback when
the facts are incomplete); see also Choy, supra note 140, at 1430 (highlighting the
potential of court-appointed expert witnesses under Rule 706 to “fill in the gaps”
where parties have found it beneficial to leave out unfavorable evidence or
opinions).
193. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the disadvantages inherent in the position of
small owners).
194. But see Deason, supra note 132, at 82 n.95 (stating that courts are justified in
refusing a request to appoint an expert when both parties have provided adequate
testimony because the additional expense might be burdensome).
195. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 73 (noting that sometimes proponents
base their allocation formula on “limited engineering work or geological data”).
196. See supra notes 146-152 and accompanying text (describing a court-appointed
expert who reviewed evidence and concluded that it was insufficient to provide the
grounds for a decision); see also Deason, supra note 132, at 94 (referring to a case in
which a court-appointed expert “evaluate[d] conflicting party expert testimony [and
discovered] that both versions [were] based on inadequate information and [were]
thus quite speculative”); Noah, supra note 153, at 1072 (indicating that peer review
can “focus attention on . . . data gaps in time for corrections” in regulatory
rulemaking procedures).
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to support the proponent’s claims that the allocation is fair, that the
project is feasible, or that it will result in substantial additional
recovery.
In some cases, a neutral expert may assist the commission by
supplying greater evidence through independent investigation and
197
Courts have appointed experts to discover additional
analysis.
information through independent tests, inspections, and
198
experiments.
Conservation commissions might similarly benefit
when a neutral expert fills information gaps through independent
collection of data on the field. For example, the neutral expert
199
might conduct 3-D seismic testing to determine the fairness of the
200
production allocation formula.
In reviewing conflicting testimony, defining information gaps, and
providing additional evidence, neutral experts may provide the
commission with the analysis needed to propose an alternative
201
formula, where the commission might otherwise approve or reject a
202
plan as presented. In this role, a neutral expert may serve to “level
203
the playing field” for interest owners who lack the resources to
204
protect their own interests in the agreement.

197. See Deason, supra note 132, at 85-86 (stating that this aids courts in
compensating for the lack of an investigative arm, such as those of the executive and
legislative branches).
198. See id. at 86 (citing environmental and patent cases in which court-appointed
experts “have performed an investigative function”).
199. See generally Anderson & Pigott, supra note 12 (discussing the development
and importance of 3-D seismic technology and problems associated with using 3D
seismic data as evidence).
200. See id. at 16-64 (arguing that if conservation agencies required the submission
of existing 3-D seismic data, unitization proceedings would be more successful
because the accuracy of the data would give holdouts little to stand on and
commissions would be more inclined to use “curtailment and shut-in orders” to
encourage unitization). However, the cost of 3-D seismic testing may outweigh its
benefits as a tool for assessing a unitization plan or allocation formula. See id. at 1650 (suggesting that 3-D seismic testing may not be “the most cost-effective choice for
every business opportunity”).
201. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93 (“Under [the two
hearing] approach, competing allocation formulas could be more objectively
evaluated, and the conservation agency could select or devise the formula that best
protects correlative rights.”); Deason, supra note 132, at 93 (discussing the value of
expert analysis in cases where party expert damage valuations are extreme and the
judge must chose one or the other).
202. See supra Part II.C.1 (noting that while commissions have the authority to
modify unitization plans, they often do not because of limited resources).
203. Anderson and Smith, Playing Field, supra note 5, at 277.
204. See Deason, supra note 132, at 94 (arguing that court-appointed experts help
compensate for the inequality created when one side is unrepresented or denied
access to key information).
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2. Using neutral experts may encourage settlement and moderate party
positions
The prospect that the commission will appoint a neutral expert to
review the evidence may lead parties to settle their disputes over the
allocation formula before they reach the hearing stage. One of the
unintended effects of using court-appointed experts has been to
205
bring about settlement. A study conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center found that one-third of judges who had appointed an expert
on one occasion stated that they had used the threat of appointment
206
on other occasions as a settlement device.
This study also found
that nine out of twenty-two cases where the court appointed an
expert before trial resulted in a settlement “before the expert
207
prepared a report or offered advice.”
Parties disputing an
allocation formula may be less willing to proceed to the hearing stage
of unitization if they believe that a neutral expert review of their
proposal may end up making them worse off. If the commission
demonstrates that it is willing to appoint a neutral expert to review
allocation formulas, this may result in a renewed effort of the parties
to negotiate the allocation formula themselves rather than face the
unknown.
The possibility that the commission will appoint a neutral expert
may also deter parties and their experts from exaggerating their
208
position. In unitization proceedings, this may dissuade proponents
of
unitization
from
overestimating
additional
recovery,
underestimating costs, or manipulating allocation formula factors in
their favor. At the same time, the potential for neutral expert review
may discourage non-consenting owners from claiming that an
allocation formula is unfair, as a pretext for prolonging the
unitization process to gain concessions from the other parties.

205. See Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1012 (“Some judges
suggested that appointment of an expert may bring about settlement, although
enhancement of settlement prospects was rarely an articulated purpose of the
appointment.”).
206. Id. at 1014.
207. Id. at 1013.
208. See FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note (“The ever-present possibility
that the judge may appoint an expert in a given case must inevitably exert a sobering
effect on the expert witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his services.”);
Deason, supra note 132, at 81-82 (indicating that the drafters of Rule 706 had hoped
that allowing courts to appoint experts would cause parties to moderate their
positions, thus reducing the need for neutral experts in the first place); Pinsky, supra
note 188, at 554 (stating that the use of court-appointed experts has “the potential to
restrain expert witnesses from making . . . claims in the first place that might seem
reasonable to lay evaluators, but that will be more quickly exposed as spurious by
their professional colleagues”).
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C. Criticism of Neutral Experts Applied to Compulsory
Unitization Proceedings
One of the main reasons judges cite for their decisions not to use
neutral experts is the lack of complex cases that demand such
209
“extraordinary action.”
A similar criticism in the compulsory
unitization context might be that conservation commissions and their
experts are presently capable of reviewing the fairness and accuracy
of unitization plans and allocation formulas. The appointment of a
neutral expert does not guarantee the accuracy or fairness of the
210
allocation formula with any scientific certainty.
However, at a
minimum, the independent expert provides one more layer of
analysis likely to create the fairest and most accurate formula
possible. Moreover, while neutral experts may not be necessary to
meet the legal standards of fairness in the allocation formula, their
appointment will signal to small interest owners that the commission
is doing everything in its power to protect their correlative rights. In
the long term this should help eliminate the perception of
unfairness.
Another popular criticism of neutral experts is that the
211
decisionmaker cannot guarantee an expert’s neutrality. Procedural
safeguards are necessary to help ensure the neutrality of the
appointed expert. For example, commissions could ask parties to
212
participate in the selection process and should allow the parties to
213
“scrutinize the nominated expert.”
209. See Cecil & Willging, Invitation, supra note 142, at 1015 (stating that the
authors’ study found that fifty out of eighty-one judges characterized appointing an
expert as an “extraordinary” action).
210. See Deason, supra note 132, at 99 (stating that the history of scientific
decision-making over the last century makes “the notion of scientific certainty seem a
bit quaint”); Gross, supra note 135, at 1193 (identifying a criticism that experts “are
as fallible as anyone else, yet they project a false aura of infallibility”); Noah, supra
note 153, at 1071 (arguing that “[n]o matter how thorough their consideration,
independent experts cannot certify the accuracy of an agency’s scientific
judgments.”).
211. See Deason, supra note 132, at 99-102 (discussing the sources of expert bias,
including “partisanship” and “the influence of social and individual context” and
their potential to affect court-appointed experts); see also Choy, supra note 140, at
1450 (discussing the various ways an “expert’s neutrality can be compromised”).
212. See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.”); see also
Choy, supra note 140, at 1447-49 (suggesting that a judge should consult with the
parties to define the scope of the experts’ review for reasons including enhancing
the legitimacy of the appointment). But see Deason, supra note 132, at 101
(illustrating the potential danger posed by party-selected experts by describing a case
in which a former colleague of a party expert was appointed); Cecil & Willging,
Court-Appointed, supra note 141, at 545 (indicating that in forty-one out of sixty-six
appointments, judges did not take suggestions from the parties).
213. See Choy, supra note 140, at 1450-51 (arguing that parties should always have
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If a commission acts on a neutral expert’s findings that an
allocation formula is unfair or that a plan is based on insufficient
214
In the
data, this will stall unitization and allow continued waste.
long term, however, this will provide additional assurance to hesitant
interest owners that the commission will not impose unitization
without sufficient data to ensure its success.
Another potential criticism is that appointing neutral experts in
the unitization proceedings will create procedural uncertainty. If the
commission decides to ignore the independent expert’s testimony,
report, or recommendations, the commission’s order may be more
215
vulnerable to being overturned by a court.
The broad deference
that courts give to commission decisions makes it unlikely that a court
will overturn a commission’s order if it is based on substantial
216
evidence.
On the other hand, the effect of a court overturning a
commission’s order because of contrary recommendations by a
neutral expert may serve compulsory unitization in the long term by
encouraging commissions to give greater weight to neutral expert
recommendations, thereby increasing the confidence of interest
owners that unitization orders are based on the most objectively
created formula.
IV. ALLOWING PARTIES TO DEMAND THE APPOINTMENT OF NEUTRAL
EXPERTS IN COMPULSORY UNITIZATION
Appointing neutral experts to review allocation formulas in the
unitization process would help reduce small interest owner
opposition to unitization. In 2000, Professors Anderson and Smith
proposed a two-step compulsory unitization hearing process in which
the commission would have the authority to hire an “independent
consultant” to review the proposed unitization agreement and
217
allocation formula.
However, it appears that most commissions
the right to scrutinize appointed experts and object to an expert “on the basis of bias
or impartiality”).
214. See Noah, supra note 153, at 1064-65 (noting one of the criticisms of peer
review is “that negative comments from peer reviewers will . . . stall valuable
rulemaking initiatives prematurely”).
215. See id. (noting another criticism of peer review is “that negative comments
from peer reviewers will . . . make final rules more vulnerable to reversal on judicial
review”).
216. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Legal Significance of Commission Approval of
Unitized Oil and Gas Operations, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 4-1, 4-53 (1986)
(suggesting that “[i]n controversial fact situations, there is almost always enough
evidence to support a commission order”).
217. Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93-94. Perhaps the most
important element of this proposal is that, “[a]fter the specific unit operations and
allocation formula receive agency approval, the necessary threshold percentages of
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seldom, if ever, appoint neutral experts in compulsory unitization
218
A provision that allows a commission to appoint
proceedings.
neutral experts at its own discretion does not provide any additional
protection of small interest owners’ correlative rights. This Part
proposes that unitization statutes or commission procedures include
a provision allowing any interest owner involved in a compulsory
unitization proceeding to demand the appointment of a neutral
expert to review the unitization plan and allocation formula.
Such a provision would assure small interest owners of their ability
to obtain an unbiased review of allocation formulas, increase their
bargaining power with larger operators, and help reverse the
perception that compulsory unitization is inherently unfair. The
potential that a neutral expert will be appointed may also encourage
parties to settle before coming to the commission, thereby expediting
the unitization process without further taxing the resources of the
219
commission.
The cost of the neutral expert is a major consideration in making
this proposal viable. If the commission bears the cost, then neutral
220
experts become a drain on its resources, deterring the commission
from appointing them. At the same time, if the working interest
proponents of the unitization plan are not responsible for the cost of
the neutral expert, the possibility of an appointment may lose some
of its value as a settlement device. On the other hand, if working
interest owners bear the cost of the neutral expert, the possibility that
a commission will appoint a neutral expert may deter operators from
pursuing unitization, while allowing small interest owners,
particularly mineral interest owners who do not pay the costs of
unitization, to use the potential for a neutral expert as a means of
increasing their bargaining power.
Kansas’ “disinterested technical consultant” provision and
Wyoming’s hearing examiner provision both require the commission
221
to pay the expert’s costs. However, in order for the neutral expert
approval . . . [are] reduced [and] could then be secured under threat of a
production-curtailment or shut-in order.” Id. at 93. If the statute grants the
commission additional powers and reduces the ratification percentages on the
condition that an independent consultant reviews the allocation formula, it is likely
this will induce the commission to hire one.
218. See supra Part III.A.3.
219. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing how the use of neutral experts encourages
settlement).
220. See Noah, supra note 153, at 1064 (highlighting the criticisms of peer review
including the suggestion that it “divert[s] scarce resources from enforcement and
related activities to pay for these added procedures”).
221. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1309 (1994) (“The cost and expense of the employment
of such a consultant shall be payable out of funds of the commission.”); WYO. STAT.
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provision envisioned in this Comment to be effective, the commission
should divide the cost of the neutral expert’s review among the
working interest owners following Professors Anderson and Smith’s
222
proposal.
Unit operations are expensive, particularly when they involve
223
These costs are traditionally paid by the
enhanced recovery.
working interest owners. The cost of one more expert, as long as it is
reasonable, is unlikely to deter applicants who have spent years
developing a unitization plan from proceeding or proposing
unitization plans that will benefit them in the long run. At the same
time, it might be significant enough to deter proponents of a plan
from taking the hard line in negotiations with small interest owners.
Giving small interest owners additional bargaining power will help
reassure them that they will receive a fair share of production,
thereby helping to reverse the negative perception of unitization that
has developed over the years.
Another consideration is the possibility that additional time will be
necessary for neutral expert review. The early appointment of a
neutral expert or a neutral expert panel would save time, effort, and
224
oil. Lost time in the unitization process equals lost production.
Lost production harms all the parties, including the State. In
addition to lost production, delaying agreement on a unitization plan
poses a problem because the longer unitization negotiations go on,
225
the more likely they are to fail. While the use of neutral experts has
226
been criticized for increasing delays in decisionmaking, disputes
between party experts over factors in the allocation formula already

ANN. § 30-5-105 (2005) (“The commission may also provide for additional
compensation to be paid to a member of the commission appointed from the public
at large or any other person designated by the commission for services performed as
an examiner at the same rate as the at-large members of the commission are
presently compensated.”).
222. See Anderson & Smith, Use of Law, supra note 7, at 93 (discussing their
proposal to use neutral experts in compulsory unitization).
223. See supra note 49 (noting that the high cost of enhanced recovery as one of
the barriers to unitization).
224. See Bishop v. Corp. Comm’n, 394 P.2d 235, 237 (Okla. 1964) (indicating that
the reservoir was losing 10,000 barrels of oil a month just prior to unitization, which
prompted the proponents of the plan to apply for an amendment to the order
making it effective immediately).
225. See Cline & Stanley, supra note 81, at 74 (noting that unit interest owners
should “weigh the economic effect of changes in participation formulas against
delays in unitization caused by arguments over formulas”).
226. See Noah, supra note 153, at 1064 (noting that peer review “exacerbat[es]
delays in rulemaking because of the additional time required for external scrutiny”);
see also Choy, supra note 140, at 1445 (describing the various ways that a courtappointed expert lengthens the duration of the litigation).
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227

result in huge delays. To avoid a detrimental increase in the length
of the unitization process, the provision should allow any owner
involved in negotiating a unitization agreement to petition the
commission to appoint a neutral expert when negotiations have
failed to reach a consensus after a set period of time. The process
might work as follows: As soon as a proponent sends out a unitization
plan to the interest owners for ratification the clock begins to run. If
after six months, for example, negotiations over the allocation
formula or unitization plan have failed to reach a consensus, any
interest owner could then ask the commission to appoint a neutral
expert to review the plans and suggest an allocation formula that
provides a fair share of production to all interest owners. Neutral
expert review will inevitably add to the length of the process, but this
type of provision may help reduce overall negotiation time and in
some cases jumpstart the process before it collapses.
CONCLUSION
A new approach to the compulsory unitization process is needed to
change small interest owners’ perception of unitization and lessen
their resistance to a conservation tool that should benefit all parties
and the public. Appointing neutral experts would make the process
less adversarial, help neutralize the superior bargaining power of
proponents of unitization plans, and reverse the perception among
small interest owners that unitization is unfair. Allowing interest
owners to demand the appointment of a neutral expert is one
method of ensuring that commissions will use their authority to
appoint experts to review allocation formulas before ordering
unitization. Broader implementation of unitization will permit
greater use of enhanced oil recovery operations and help increase
the domestic oil reserves.

227. See Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 79, at 696-97 (illustrating the problem of
lengthy negotiations by describing the negotiations for a voluntary unit on the
Prentice field in West Texas where differences over estimates of porosity delayed
agreement for nine years).

